The tragedy of Iraq, of what is now going on in North Korea and Iran, and of what has happened in recent years in India and Pakistan on nuclear weapons, all lead to the unavoidable conclusion that the global non-proliferation regime is on the verge of total collapse.

The United States was right to insist on compulsory resumption of inspections in Iraq. The non-proliferation regime cannot be allowed to bleed to death. It is also true that the pressure generated by deployment of U.S. and UK armed forces to the Near East was a central factor in gaining some Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions. But the final military remedy undertaken by the United States and the UK is not only of questionable legality, it will be far too costly in human lives, money, and political damage to be repeated elsewhere as a remedy for proliferation emergencies. It is likely that, for a long time to come, the U.S. will not be in a position to intervene on its own against proliferation elsewhere even if it wants to.

As a result, as conflict winds down in Iraq, it is probable that international action against proliferation will also have reached a dead end. The United States itself will be bogged down in Iraq. The multilateral non-proliferation regime has already been seriously damaged by the dispute over Iraq, including U.S. attacks on the UN and the inspection process, and the withdrawal of U.S. confidence in the capability of the Security Council to enforce compliance with disarmament agreements.

Once governments have somewhat recovered from their post-Iraq shock, have taken stock of this situation, and have seen how dangerous it is for everyone, they will have to conclude that they must tackle the problem of proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons seriously. The UN Security Council is the instance of last resort for all arms control and disarmament treaties, including the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the treaties on biological and chemical weapons. It is the only mechanism for this purpose. It must be made to work effectively. This can be done only if the United States does its job and convinces China, Russia, France and also the UK of the dangers of the situation and that they have to cooperate in making the Security Council work.

This process has to start with post-Iraq realization by the United States that it can’t do the job alone, that in its own interest it must move to repair the international relationships damaged in the struggle over Iraq, and must seek to win the other permanent members of the Security Council to cooperation. The process must also start with the clear realization by the other permanent members of the Security Council and elected Council members that proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons is a potentially catastrophic peril facing us all and that they must learn to work together to deal with it. In short, we must hope that the trauma of the confrontation over Iraq will finally bring realization of their dangerous failure thus far -- and of their profound international responsibility -- to the capitals of all five permanent Security Council members.

The positive result should be unwavering emphasis by a unified Security Council on preventive steps, far preferable to enforced compliance. These preventive steps should include universal application of the IAEA’s additional safeguards protocol to all NPT states and agreement on a verification system and scientists’ code of conduct for the Biological Weapons Convention. They should include rapid agreement on a treaty to end the production of fissile material for weapons and, in order to secure China’s acceptance of this necessary agreement, on a five-year moratorium on weaponization of space while the spacefaring states cooperate to see whether they can develop effective verification for a more durable agreement. The steps should include verified limits on the nuclear arsenals of the six states with nuclear weapons that do not now have any limits and decisive movement toward the elimination of their arsenals by all of the states with nuclear weapons. This is the NPT obligation of all the permanent members of the Security Council and a political necessity if they are to gain the cooperation of countries without nuclear weapons for essential moves to tighten the non-proliferation regime.

The steps should include, in addition to assuring the complete disarming of Iraq, Chinese, Russian, American, Japanese, and South Korean cooperation, starting with U.S.-North Korean bilateral dialogue, in making North Korea a disarmed but also a viable state – none of these other governments today wants the collapse of North Korea. And the steps should include dealing with Iran’s security needs in a way which will make nuclear weapons appear unnecessary for the Iranian leadership, through a regional security agreement and limits on the nuclear capabilities of all states in the area.

The United States and other world governments may have one more chance to control weapons of mass destruction before they are loosed on us all.