Summary

Available indications suggest that, within two weeks after the November, 2002 congressional elections, the U.S. administration will undertake decisive action to launch a preemptive military attack on a foreign government, the Republic of Iraq. This momentous action will take place without a declaration of war by the U.S. Congress or a resolution of the UN Security Council, and with minimal involvement and discussion by the American public.

This paper seeks to evaluate the administration's case for such an attack. To sum up the paper's findings, the administration's arguments for preemptive attack on Iraq are very weak, consisting mainly of remote possibilities that are presented as near-certainties: There is no evidence for the existence of an "Axis of Evil," for active cooperation among rogue countries or for cooperation between rogue countries and terrorist groups to provide terrorists with weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, chemical or biological -- to attack the U.S. Yet the administration expects the American people and the Congress to accept these assertions as a valid basis for military attack on a foreign country by U.S. armed forces.

Iraq has no active links with Iran, North Korea, or al Qaeda. Iraq has been under close satellite, electronic and aerial surveillance since 1991. Restrictive controls on Iraqi imports have continued. There is no evidence yet available that, since 1991, Iraq has produced fissile material for weapons, or extended the permitted range of its Scud missiles. It is unlikely that Iraq is producing large stocks of chemical weapons. It is highly unlikely that, if Saddam Hussein, a leader of a socialist secular party, did have such weapons, he would entrust them to a fanatical Islamic cult like al Qaeda. Saddam Hussein himself is not a suicidal religious fanatic. His actions can be constrained by knowledge that drastic retaliation will follow any aggressive action from him.

On the other hand, while Saddam would probably be deposed by preemptive U.S. attack on Iraq, the costs of that attack would be extremely high: They include U.S. casualties, much larger Iraqi casualties, including civilians, and the need for long-term U.S. military occupation to maintain Iraq as a viable, unified state. U.S. attack on Iraq would maximize the chance of Iraqi attack on Israel. It could cause the fall of moderate Arab governments and bring radical Islamists to power. The negative Arab reaction would eliminate for a long time to come Arab support for resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation and acceptance of Israel's existence. The monetary costs of preemptive attack, especially for the post-conflict operation in Iraq, will be high, far exceeding the $60 billion cost of the Gulf War. The U.S. will have to shoulder most of these costs itself because, unlike the Gulf War, Saddam's present culpability is not at all evident to the U.S. allies and friends who in 1991 willingly financed the Gulf War. Disruption of Mideast oil production, with serious effects on the economies of the United States and Europe, is also probable.

The cost of preemptive attack in damage to the rule of law and to the international standing and influence of the U.S. will be very high. In effect, the United States will be branded as an international rogue state -- and will have become one.

The Alternative

The U.S. should weigh the potential Iraqi threat against the manifestly heavy costs of U.S. preemptive attack on Iraq. The wise conclusion for the U.S. is to drop the idea of preemptive attack against Iraq and to follow a policy of watchful containment. This would include continuing UK and U.S. overflights of Iraq; maintenance of prohibited zones; and maintenance of trade controls and sanctions, plus continuing pressure on Saddam Hussein and possible successors to fulfill the obligations Iraq undertook at the end of the Gulf War. This is the least expensive and most effective approach to the Iraqi problem. The United States and the Western countries can surely outlast Saddam Hussein while limiting the damage of which he is capable.

If in the future there is hard evidence that Iraq does possess important stocks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and in addition Iraq threatens to use these weapons against its neighbors or makes visible preparation to do so, the administration should request congressional authority for military action against Iraq if Iraq refuses a Security Council ultimatum to immediately admit U.S. and allied military personnel to remove the Iraqi weapons. It is assumed that, in these circumstances, Israeli forces may already have struck Iraq. It is far preferable, however, while Iraq continues to abstain from aggressive actions, to live with current suspicions than to incur the high costs of preemptive attack.

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The Axis of Evil and the War on Iraq

President Bush's State of the Union speech in January, 2002, described the "Axis of Evil" as the greatest threat to the security of the U.S. and the world. He presented three countries that have been characterized as "rogue states" -- Iraq, Iran and North Korea -- as closely allied with one another, and as cooperating with al Qaeda and other transnational terrorists to provide the latter with weapons of mass destruction to be used against the United States and its allies.

The administration's concept of the Axis of Evil was a stroke of genius in political presentation. It linked the al Qaeda terrorists who had struck a murderous blow at targets on U.S. soil with three countries suspected of proliferation, especially nuclear proliferation, which were attracting little attention from the American public, but which, according to the administration concept, could provide al Qaeda with much-feared weapons of mass destruction. The concept had two main effects: It made international terrorism, now linked with a plausible source of the world's most dangerous weapons, a continuing, even more deadly threat to American citizens than it had been before, and, for the first time, it made the distant proliferators an active threat to average American citizens because their weapons could now be delivered to American cities and towns by terrorists. Homeland defense and the deployment of U.S. armed forces abroad became part of a unified answer to these threats. The Axis concept united those Americans who are inclined to put home defense first with internationalist interveners who want to pursue the threat to its home base. With one stroke, the Axis concept expanded the War on Terrorism to a war against proliferation and terrorism, of which the proliferators are the more dependably visible targets. Going beyond a dispersed, shadowy terrorist organization that was probably losing its punch, the real enemy facing the United States suddenly became identified as the leaders of the rogue states, above all, as Saddam Hussein of Iraq, for the last decade the most prominent and detested enemy of the United States. Now Hussein was not only detestable, he had become a direct threat to the domestic security of the United States' citizens and territory, with a potential for destruction theoretically far greater than the devastation of the September 11 attacks. The logic of the Axis concept points to the conclusion that, if Iraq is dealt with militarily, similar action should in future be taken against Iran and North Korea.

Analyzing the Axis of Evil

Like other aspects of the War on Terrorism, the Axis concept contains many weak and unconvincing components, which make it a dangerous and risky approach with high costs. As with its treatment of al Qaeda, the administration has glued together some theoretical possibilities and hypotheses and treated them as certainties. To start with, other than sale of North Korean missiles to Iran, there is no known link among the three rogue state governments. Iraq and Iran fought a bloody war against one another and have deep-seated hostility deepened by religious differences. There is no bond of sympathy between the two Near Eastern states and distant North Korea which, together with Vietnam, is one of the last Communist holdout states. It is highly implausible that the hardnosed rulers of Iraq, North Korea and Iran would, if they had them, entrust their ultimate weapons to members of a gang of religious fanatics.. There is no "axis" in the Axis of Evil, either as regards links among the rogue states or ties binding these states to al Qaeda or other transnational terrorist organizations in order to attack the United States.

The administration arguments also contain considerable exaggeration of the capabilities of the individual countries composing the Axis of Evil. All three rogue states may possess limited amounts of chemical and biological weapons. However, none of the three governments are known to have an active nuclear arsenal. It is unlikely that any of them now have usable nuclear weapons and even more unlikely that they have complete transportable nuclear weapons which they could give to terrorists if they wanted to. North Korea might have been on the way to developing nuclear weapons, but was blocked by the United States and other countries. As checked by IAEA at Iranian invitation, Iran now has no installations or reactors that could produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Chemical and biological weapons are more easily concealed, but none of the Axis powers has delivery means that could carry out more than an isolated attack. None of the three have accurate missiles. Neither Iraq nor Iran have missiles that could reach the United States. North Korea has one.

Whatever the nature of Saddam Hussein, of the clerical leaders of Iran, and Kim Jong Il of North Korea, no one has suggested that they were potential candidates for martyrdom operations, impervious to the certain retaliation that would follow any attacks from them on the United States. Nor has any of these governments, either acting on their own or using the anonymity of terrorist help, the capacity to deliver the nation-destroying attack that was possible in the Cold War U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation. An attack by any of the three governments on U.S. territory is improbable and if it came, would be limited to a few sites at most, leaving an aroused and powerful United States to track down the perpetrators and retaliate, as it did with great speed with al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

This is why the "war" against terrorism is a misnomer. In modern times, "war" has most often involved all-out effort to destroy a nation. War is the wrong word for the current situation, since the survival of our nation is not remotely at stake from current or future al Qaeda attack, even in the beefed-up version of the Axis of Evil. The United States is involved in a campaign against terrorism, not a war. Administration actions in the domestic security field to reduce the risk of individual terrorist attacks are justifiable. However, curtailment of individual liberties is not.

Arch Enemy Iraq

Iraq is the component of the Axis of Evil coalition against which the Bush administration is seeking to build a case for preemptive attack in order to bring about "regime change."

As regards the administration's argument, there is almost no evidence of any substantive relationship between al Qaeda and Iraq. There is one uncorroborated although frequently cited report of a single encounter in Prague between al Qaeda suicide bomber Mohammed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer. Together with other Arab donor governments, Saddam Hussein has provided money grants of $20,000-$25,000 to families of Hamas suicide bombers and has supported Palestinian terrorists, but not anti-U.S. Islamists. It is highly improbable that a hypersuspicious man like Saddam Hussein, leader of a non-religious Arab socialist party, the Baath Party, has the slightest trust in or regard for a fundamentalist radical Islamist group like al Qaeda. If Iraq had secretly produced WMD and were going to use it in a terrorist mode, it would entrust its weapons only to its most proven, experienced and reliable personnel. In summarizing the administration case against Saddam Hussein on August 26, Vice President Cheney makes no mention of the possibility that Saddam might provide terrorists with weapons of mass destruction, although this claim is the major component of the Axis of Evil concept.

In fact, the Bush administration is not making a major effort to link Iraq with al Qaeda. Instead, it is now claiming that the Iraqi government itself is the main current source of danger to the U.S. and its allies. Presumably, this Iraqi threat is based on the combination of two factors. The first is that Saddam Hussein is a totally unscrupulous tyrant, in effect, a pathological, aggressive killer of the Hitler type who will strike at the United States and its allies as soon as he has the capacity. The second is that Saddam Hussein already has or is actually developing weapons of mass destruction.

Saddam Hussein has demonstrated himself to be a deceitful, aggressive tyrant. But what about the weapons claim? Even though UN inspections in Iraq were suspended in 1998, all stocks of WMD and production sites located by UN inspectors were destroyed. Restriction of Iraqi imports has continued, and Iraq has been kept under close scrutiny by U.S. and UK aircraft and satellites. It is very unlikely that, given the size and nature of the installations needed, Iraq has produced its own fissile material for nuclear weapons since 1998, when UN inspectors were expelled by Iraq. Even Vice President Cheney in making the administration's case against Saddam Hussein has not argued that Iraq has nuclear weapons. Instead, he said on August 26 that Saddam wants time in order "to gain possession of nuclear weapons." Iraqi development of longer range missiles and production of large stocks of chemical weapons is also unlikely and would have been observed. Iraq has short range missiles (highly inaccurate) and may still have small stocks of chemical and biological weapons, not enough for a nationwide attack even on a small neighboring country like Israel. The past is no guarantee of the present, but earlier Iraqi work with biological weapons was with anthrax and botulinum, rather than with communicable diseases like plague and smallpox, which have far greater risk of striking down their producers and their countrymen as well as intended victims. Whatever chemical weapons Iraq may still possess, chemical weapons can be used only for military purposes or for terrorist attacks on individual sites. They require too much volume and are too subject to wind and weather to be used for nationwide attack.

Judging from administration behavior, it is unlikely that the administration has hard information on Iraqi production of WMD. If it did have knowledge of actual Iraqi production sites, it should act to demand their specific inspection and then to destroy them if inspection produces evidence of illicit activity, or to destroy them directly. In the absence of such information, the administration's case against Saddam Hussein must be based on Saddam's past activities, not on his current activities or evidence of them.

In sum, there is no evidence that Iraq is now capable or will be capable of making a long-range attack on U.S. territory anytime in the next decade. In fact, the administration does not spend much effort in arguing that Saddam Hussein might seek to attack the United States directly in the near future, only that, given his personality and aims, there is a danger he might attack the United States at some future point. Instead, the administration stresses Saddam's aggression against Iran and Kuwait, his ruthless repression of domestic opposition and his use of poison gas against Iran and Iraqi Kurds, and charges that Iraq is a growing threat to U.S. allies.

The only U.S. ally within range of Iraqi weapons is Israel. Iraq may be capable of limited attacks on Israel. Saddam is unscrupulous and aggressive, but not a fundamentalist suicidal fanatic. In the light of the certainty of dire Israeli retaliation, backed by the U.S., Saddam Hussein is not likely to use these weapons even if he does have them unless he is backed into a corner.

Wholly omitted from the administration's argument is this point, that possession of weapons does not automatically mean the threat of rapid attack. Throughout history, governments have been prevented from attack by the fear of retaliation. That threat is already understood by Iraq and can be reinforced. Contrary to administration statements, the most pressing danger of an Iraqi attack on Israel will come with a U.S. attack on Iraq. This assessment is shared by the Israeli authorities, who are now issuing new gas masks and conducting a program of smallpox vaccination.

If the case for preemptive attack on Iraq is weak, why is the Bush administration pressing this issue so vigorously?

One plausible answer is that the administration's campaign to bring about regime change in Iraq is motivated mainly by the desire to maintain the flagging momentum of the War on Terrorism through opening a dramatic new theater of military operations with a new villain, Saddam Hussein, to replace the missing Osama bin Laden. But, if the administration is genuinely concerned with the possibility of Iraqi WMD attack on the United States or its allies, where is the administration's insistence on tough, effective UN inspections in Iraq, which would either produce convincing evidence of Saddam's aggressive WMD activities and violation of international treaties or restrict his ability to produce and deliver these weapons, or at least produce an internationally acceptable casus belli if Saddam refuses?

Preemption

In his June 1, 2002 West Point speech, President Bush publicly announced a concept of preemptive action against possible proliferators, since then linked increasingly to Iraq. This concept is questionable on practical and moral grounds. Nonetheless, the administration has indicated that it will form part of a formal National Security Strategy now being drafted.

In addition to other important problems, preemptive attack depends on reliable intelligence that there is an immediate threat. The consequences of error could be very serious and often are, as the July, 2002 U.S. attack on an Afghan wedding party demonstrates. However, according to press reports, Secretary Rumsfeld speaking at NATO on June 6 said that the Alliance could not wait for "absolute proof" before a preemptive attack is launched. Preemptive use of weapons by the U.S. on the basis of incomplete evidence is a very disquieting prospect. In the case of Iraq, it is clear that the administration does not have full evidence.

It is legitimate to act preemptively in self-defense in the face of a specific, imminent and evident challenge. However, there is an unevaluated assumption in the administration's case for preemption that the Axis countries, especially Iraq, would try to attack the United States and its allies as soon as they are able. This is another instance in administration arguments of transmuting a theoretical possibility to a certainty. We have argued here that, even if he possessed WMD capability, Saddam Hussein would hesitate to use it for fear of retaliation. The point is that it is not legitimate to threaten early use of weapons, possibly including nuclear weapons, when threats from others are not pressing or evident and may not become so. It is also not legitimate to threaten early use of weapons when approaches of diplomacy and negotiation are either untried or not exhausted.

In the cold war nuclear confrontation, preemption or even the appearance of possible preemptive action was regarded as something which must be avoided because it could trigger a full nuclear exchange. Its use today against Iraq could still bring serious counterattack, and its threat could trigger an armed Iraqi reaction that otherwise might not come.

Preemption is also not legitimate or moral if the actual political or military objective is broader than the announced target of preemption. This is the situation with regard to Iraq, where the ostensible objective would be to block imminent WMD attack on the U.S. or its allies, but the actual objective would be regime change. Because a policy of preemption has no congressional authorization, although it would entail unannounced military attack on foreign countries, it has an unconstitutional quality.

To summarize, except in cases of immediately evident danger, preemption is the essence of unilateralism in foreign policy. Preemptive military action is immoral in causing loss of life without full prior exploration of alternatives to the use of force. If carried out without prior consultation with the Congress and the American public, including public presentation and discussion of convincing evidence, it is behavior which we would term authoritarian if other governments engaged in it. Carried out without an effort to secure authorization by the Security Council, it would brand the U.S. as an international rogue state.

Costs of Preemptive Attack

The costs of a U.S preemptive attack on Iraq will be high. They include U.S. casualties, much larger Iraqi casualties, including civilians, and the need for long-term U.S. engagement to maintain Iraq as a viable, unified state. They include the probability of triggering an Iraqi attack on Israel and a devastating Israeli response which would further unite Arab opinion both against Israel and the United States. They include, as Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, King Abdullah of Jordan, and other Arab leaders have been warning, a public backlash which could depose moderate Arab governments and replace them with Islamist radicals, or cause continuing intense civil strife in these countries, fulfilling bin Laden's aims in his attack on the United States and also raising serious additional obstacles to long-term prospects of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation. The monetary costs, especially for the post-conflict operation in Iraq, will be high, exceeding the $60 billion cost of the Gulf War. The U.S. will have to shoulder most of these costs itself because, unlike the Gulf War, Saddam's present culpability is not evident to the U.S. allies and friends who in 1991 were convinced of that culpability and, as a result, willingly financed the Gulf War. Disruption of Mideast oil production, with serious effects on the economies of the United States and Europe, is probable. The cost in damage to the rule of law and to the international standing and influence of the United States will be very high. In effect, the United States will be branded as an international rogue state and will have become one.