The cardinal mission of the United Nations is to prevent war and the loss of human life in war. It does this through negotiation, conflict prevention, and through control of the weapons of war.

      Today, now that major military action in Iraq is over, but the world stands under the shadow of another confrontation in North Korea and perhaps Iran, I would like to discuss with you the question of the use of armed force to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

      This is of course a sensitive issue, but in circumstances where proliferation is taking place at a dangerous rate, it is necessary that we look at it dispassionately.

      I think it is fair to say that proliferation issues have been the main international security theme of the past decade, from the first Gulf War in 1991, with its revelation of Iraqi violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to the North Korean crisis of 1993-94, to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998, to the recurrence of the North Korean crisis in 2002-2003, to intensification of concerns over nuclear developments in Iran, and to the series of events culminating with the U.S.-UK military action against Iraq in March-April of this year.

      The only major international event of the past decade which does not fit into this complex of issues is the al Qaeda attack on New York and Washington on September 11, two years ago tomorrow. However, President Bush has insisted that terrorists and proliferating weapons of mass destruction are part of the same overall threat to U.S. security, and in September, 2002, the Bush administration published a National Security Strategy Report which sought to justify the use of armed force against proliferation. As you recollect, this policy paper argued that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of undeterrable rogue states and terrorist organizations has created a new threat to national and international security so dangerous that it justifies preemptive or preventive military action to cut off this development before it can culminate in actual attack with nuclear or biological weapons.

      This policy was the major public rationale for the U.S.-UK military action against Iraq. It has caused a great deal of comment throughout the world.

      Now that major military action in Iraq is over, it seems useful to review the preemption strategy for indications of future developments in U.S. and international policy on the proliferation problems which have become the crucial security issue of our time.

      The two main questions I would like to address today are, first, has a new threat to international security emerged over this past decade which is in fact so serious that it justifies the use of military force to block it? Second, if there is a threat of such unprecedented seriousness that military action is justified, is preventive military action the best way to cope with it?

      President Bush presented the classic statement of the new proliferation threat as seen by his administration in his State of the Union speech in January 2002: As you recollect, he argued that undeterrable rogue states are developing weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, chemical and biological -- which, when possible, they would use directly against the United States and would also transfer to even less deterrable and more stealthy suicidal terrorist groups for attack on the U.S. itself, U.S. forces abroad, U.S. allies, and, presumably, other countries.

      Few people will dispute the lethality of these weapons, especially nuclear and biological weapons. Most people also agree that there has been especially dangerous proliferation over the past decade. In fact, as early as January, 1992, the Security Council, meeting at the heads of government level, declared that, "Proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security." I read this statement as representing the view that proliferation can fall under Chapter VII of the Charter and in extreme cases justify the use of armed force.

      Given the proliferation which has taken place since 1992, I believe this conclusion of the Security Council remains valid today, especially as regards nuclear proliferation. The more nuclear states there are, the greater the possibility of nuclear blackmail, the greater the possibility of a chaotic nuclear arms race, the greater the possibility of theft, illicit purchase, or forcible seizure of these weapons, and the greater the possibility that these weapons will actually be used. To me, it seems justifiable to use armed force to prevent such developments.

      With regard to other aspects of the administration's preemption strategy, I doubt the claim that the proliferating states with which we are now confronted - Iran, North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel - would not be deterred by the possibility of nuclear retaliation. It also seems to me doubtful that any of these governments would undertake the risk of deliberately transferring weapons to extremist terrorist groups beyond their control.

      There remains the risk that terrorist groups might gain access to nuclear or biological weapons through illicit purchase, theft, or forcible seizure. However, al Qaeda is at present the only international terrorist group with capabilities of this kind, and it has been hit hard, with two-thirds of its leaders killed or in custody and 2,000 of its members imprisoned throughout the world.

      Therefore, the main WMD threat to international peace, it seems to me, remains the classic threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons, with a secondary threat of terrorist action. The old threat has reemerged, but with fearsome increase of intensity. The non-proliferation regime appears to be unraveling. Proliferation of nuclear weapons in the hands of a state which would probably make multiple use of nuclear weapons if it were going to use them at all, is a greater threat to the world community than a terrorist group which might use a dirty radiological bomb with limited effects.

      I believe the dangers from unrestrained proliferation of nuclear weapons are such that they would appear to justify the use of military force as a last resort to block this development. In fact, the European Union comes to this conclusion in its June 2003 statement on proliferation.

      Turning to the second question, if the danger of uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons does justify use of armed force to prevent it, under what conditions should military force be used, and what about preemption?

      In its September 2002 National Security Strategy, the Bush administration argued for preemptive attack, more accurately, preventive attack. This concept provided the major rationale for the U.S.-UK March-April attack on Iraq. But, as the crisis over Iraq in the Security Council clearly demonstrated, the preventive attack concept has two built-in shortcomings which prevented it from gaining the support of the majority of Security Council governments at the time -- and will almost certainly again do so in the future.

      First, the doctrine is based on a theory of possible future actions by a hostile state five, ten or more years in the future. It ignores all the other possibilities in the situation, that the suspect country may not succeed in developing the weapon, and that the state may change its policy or even its government in the interim. The policy assumes that hostile future action by the suspect government is not only possible, but predestined.

      Second, given the fact that prevention doctrine deals with weapons development, which is almost always held secret, information about that development in the hands of other governments is intelligence information -- almost always fragmentary, inadequate, and disputable. But actions of war, killing fellow human beings on both sides, are irrevocable. They should not be undertaken on the basis of fragmentary information about hypothetical future possibilities.

      Decisions on anticipatory military action are especially fallible and prone to error. To reduce the unavoidable risk of error, decisions to use force should not rest on the judgment of one or two governments, but should be taken by several governments. The logical place for such decisions is the Security Council.

      In its June, 2003, position paper on proliferation, the European Union, although it agrees that the danger from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could on occasion be so great as to justify the use of military force, also considers that the use of force should be governed by the principles of the UN Charter. That is, that decisions of this kind should be taken by the Security Council, rather than by member states on their own. The EU seems to be saying that, although preventive anticipatory action might take place under time pressure, the issues of war and peace are so prone to error and misjudgment that it is justifiable to take the additional risk of having to spend more time to get more evidence and to convince more governments.

      I believe this is the lesson of the Iraq war for future action against proliferation. The aftermath of the war, including the absence thus far of stocks of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the problems of the military occupation, which are requiring the Bush administration to reach out to the UN for help with troops and money, illustrate the possibilities of mistaken assessments. They also mean that the Bush administration will find it difficult and probably impossible to gain the support of the U.S. public for further preventive attacks, for example against Iran, even though Iran's nuclear activities cause justifiable concern. That is, the U.S. will have to tackle the problem of Iran as well as Iraq multilaterally if at all. As regards North Korea, the U.S. is already enveloped in a grouping of regional powers of its own making.

      So, as I see it, the Bush administration claim that, in extreme circumstances, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction justifies the use of military force, has been endorsed, both by the Security Council in 1992 and by the European Union in 2003.

      This is a very important conclusion for the future, but only a partial one. The European Union's June, 2003 position endorses the use of military force as a last resort to counter proliferation, but it also insists that the use of force in this case follow the rules of the UN Charter.

      This EU decision, endorsed among others by the foreign ministers of France and Germany, extends the hand of compromise to the U.S., bridging the disputes in the Security Council over action against Iraq. This outcome was formalized in the joint statement of President Bush and European Council President Simitis on June 25 that "Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . . . constitutes a major threat to international peace and security. . . . We pledge to use all means available to avert WMD proliferation and the calamities that would follow."

      The EU position is the right conclusion to be drawn about the use of military force to counter proliferation, namely, that it is acceptable as a last resort if a majority of the Security Council agrees that it is necessary. I also conclude from the same factors that I have cited this morning that the U.S.-UK attack on Iraq will be the only case of preemptive or preventive military action against proliferation outside the Security Council by the present U.S. or UK administrations.