United Nations Peacekeeping Missions

Enhancing Capacity for Rapid and Effective Troop Deployment

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Report of Global Action to Prevent War

A Coalition–Building Effort to Stop War, Genocide and Internal Armed Conflict
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

UN peacekeeping missions have experienced exponential growth in the post cold war period, with over 100,000 personnel operating in 17 missions as of December 2007. This growth has coincided with an expansion in peacekeeping mandates from traditional conflict containment activities to encompass truce monitoring, electoral assistance, and humanitarian responsibilities. The growing complexity of missions, the continued lack of political will by member states to contribute troops, and logistical constraints have led to slow troop deployment, with tragic consequences as seen in Rwanda and most recently in Darfur.

The paper examines rapid and effective deployment through a matrix, which incorporates troop deployment timeframe, deployment methodology and troop training. These are highlighted as crucial requirements in attaining positive peacekeeping outcomes from a security and humanitarian perspective. According to the Brahimi Report (2000), best practices deployment timeframes range from 30days (traditional missions) to 90days (complex missions). This paper defines deployment within a narrower 48-72hr period as necessary for suitable emergency and humanitarian response.

The need for a shorter timeframe is demonstrated through the example of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the devastation of war has left over 3.5million people dead (direct or indirectly). Security Council resolution 1291 authorised 6,000 troops, of which the first 100 took over two months to deploy and troop numbers reached 4,300 by Jan 2003 (nearly three years after the resolution). Based on estimates of 31,000 deaths per month Brahimi’s benchmark of 90 days (complex missions) would have left over 93,000 dead, illustrating the necessity for effective and rapid deployment.

This report seeks to understand the troop deployment gap by analysing two elements of UN deployment. First is the ‘gap’ between Security Council resolutions and the time of ‘first’ troop deployment. As highlighted, this is a crucial period as “the first six to twelve weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord are often the most critical ones for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of a new operation”. Second is the ‘gap’ between Security Council resolution and final/maximum troop deployment. To analyse the impact of rapid troop deployment, ‘first’ and ‘maximum’ deployment gaps are measured against troop numbers authorised in the initial SC resolution. Ongoing mandate and troop changes in consequent resolutions are not included in this report.

Report Outcomes
Based on a sample of 15 missions (across regions), on average over the last 15 years the UN has taken ‘46 days’ to begin deployment of peacekeepers. This illustrated in peacekeeping missions below:

- UNOCI in Cote d’Ivoire took 36 days to deploy its first 13% of its troops
- The UNTAET mission in Timor Leste (East Timor) took 3 months to send less than 11% of the total authorised force
- in contrast to the Australian interim force which, operating under national command deployed in a matter of weeks
- UNMIS in Sudan, saw only 821 UN troops enter Sudan in the first 3 months

Mission breakdown by final troop deployment numbers indicated that on average missions took close to ‘13 months’ to reach maximum deployment. Of the 13 missions analysed the shortest period from resolution to near full deployment was three months (eg; MINURCA, Central African Republic and UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone).

- Haiti mission MINUSTAH, deployment took over 21 months and the final number of 7,519 troops was more than a 1,000 below authorised strength.
- UNMIL in Liberia took over 23 months
- MONUC in the DRC took over 35 months and only reached 73% of authorised strength

The report identified a number of trends in missions from troop composition to impact of timeframes within Security Council Resolutions. A pertinent deployment trend is the high degree of re-hatting in peacekeeping missions, with more than 50% or 30K peacekeepers being deployed through re-hatting.

Based on the findings the report advances three proposals.

Proposal 1 – UN Emergency Peacekeeping Service (UNEPS)
Global Action proposes the creation of a standing UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) to meet the capacity and UN member state commitment gap. A UNEPS initiative would require up to 15,000 military, police, and humanitarian personnel that are individually recruited from a pool of applicants, and would exist on a permanent basis. The standing service would be a ‘first in, first out’ response to crisis and act in a complimentary manner with other UN and regional conflict prevention and peacekeeping initiatives. A standing service would enable the UN to achieve rapid deployment, unified and effective training, greater logistical capability and troop contribution.
Proposal 2 – Regional Capacity Building
Acknowledging the long-term goal of a UNEPS service, Global action also proposes simultaneous strengthening of regional peacekeeping capacity. With over 65% of peacekeeping missions currently operating in Africa, this proposal focuses on bodies such as; African Union (AU) and ECOWAS which have taken a leadership role in peacekeeping activities. The establishment of the African Union Standby Force (ASF) initiative and growing number of missions in Darfur, Burundi and Somali indicates the desire for ‘home-based’ solutions. While many challenges remain, there are attainable benefits through financial, logistical and resource assistance to strengthen and sustain current and future peacekeeping operations.

Proposal 3 - Reinforcing Current Standing Operations
The final proposal reinforces the recommendations outlined in the Brahimi report on strengthening current standing operations. This urges member countries to establish ‘on call’ lists through UN’s Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS), to encourage availability of troops/police/civilians for deployment. Existing forces such as SHIRBRIG must be strengthened and more like-minded nations should be encouraged to form standby brigades of this kind. This option provides a less ‘risky’ path for member states, as it operates within the framework of an existing UN structure while moving towards rapid deployment.
INTRODUCTION

The UN has no standing army. We have no standing cadre of support or other professionals; they all have to be recruited one by one, either from other missions or external sources. We have no standing strategic planning capacity; that has to be mobilized, every time. We have no standing logistical contracts that we can just expand on a moment’s notice; these have to be negotiated individually—all of the movements of these troops, all of the arrangements for accommodation that has to be built, water has to be found, land has to be procured…3

Jane Holl Lute, Assistant Secretary General, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

The UN faces a plethora of challenges when planning and deploying peacekeeping missions. These limitations have resulted in the “Commitment-Capacity Gap”4, with extended periods required for troop deployment, which in turn inhibits the UN from meeting the core principles highlighted in ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ and ‘An Agenda for Peace’5. The UN member states have sought to address these limitations through restructuring DPKO, strengthening the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) and supporting regional standby forces such as SHIRBRIG6. However, these initiatives still face operational and political limitations, preventing effective structures for rapid deployment from being established and implemented.

The concept of rapid and effective deployment is examined through a matrix, which incorporates troop deployment timeframe, deployment methodology and troop training. These are highlighted as crucial requirements in attaining positive peacekeeping outcomes from a security and humanitarian perspective. Further, the report documents gaps in the deployment trends of peacekeeping missions from Africa and the Americas through to Asia and in turn justifies the need for alternative proposals to mitigate this gap. Such proposals include the creation of a rapid response capacity (United Nations Emergency Peace Service proposal), building regional capacity or enhancing existing standby mechanisms.

RAPID AND EFFECTIVE TROOP DEPLOYMENT

Fast and effective troop deployment is crucial in all peacekeeping operations; with “vast human suffering, death, diminished credibility, opportunities lost and escalating costs” just some of the tragic consequences of slow and inappropriate UN troop deployment.7. This report seeks to identify key components required for rapid and effective troop deployment.

3 Hanson S. “Hybrid Peacekeeping Force in Darfur an 'Unprecedented' Operation”, New York Times, August 2nd 2007
4 Langille H. P. “Bridging the Commitment Capacity Gap”, Center for UN Reform Education. August 2002
5 Principles can be obtained in the “Responsibility to Protect Report”, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, www.iciss.ca
6 Id
7 Langille H. P, “Conflict Prevention: Options for Rapid Deployment and UN Standing Forces”, 1999
Table 1: Rapid and Effective Troop Deployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Proposed</th>
<th>Current</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Frame for Troop</td>
<td>48 – 72 hours</td>
<td>30 – 90 days (based on Brahimi Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Strategic and</td>
<td>Based on availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Training</td>
<td>Unified and</td>
<td>Ad hoc, Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-dimensional</td>
<td>by troop contributing nation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Troop Deployment Timeframe**

Deployment timeframes, both in relation to ‘first’ and ‘maximum’ troop deployment are key factors analysed within this report. The ‘gap’ between initial Security Council resolution authorization and when troops are deployed into a conflict situation is crucial in understanding the peacekeeping missions’ ability to meet its mandate, restore security and reduce negative humanitarian impact.

The Brahimi Report (2000) notes that achieving rapid and effective deployment is dependant on UN deployment of traditional missions within a 30 day timeframe and more complex missions within 90 days. These recommendations are based on realistic achievements of the UN rather than on the maximum potential impact of missions. In most emergency situations, the first 48-72 hours are crucial in diffusing the security situation and minimising lives lost, therefore troop deployment within 48-72 hours of Security Council authorisation is necessary for peacekeeping missions to be effective in achieving these goals. The 48-72 hour timeframe criteria will be utilised throughout this paper in examining current capacity and proposed recommendations.

Since the early 90s, a range of initiatives have been proposed in an attempt to improve troop response time. The UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) was initiated in 1993 with the aim of improving the UN’s access to readily available deployment capabilities. UNSAS is based upon conditional commitments by Members States to contribute specified resources within pre-agreed response times for UN peacekeeping operations. The system also facilitates planning and preparation through knowledge of national assets of participating countries. However, the major limitation of UNSAS is the lack of a binding obligation. This was demonstrated in Rwanda, when none of the 19 states with standby Memoranda of Understanding agreed to contribute to the UNAMIR mission.

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9 Langille H. P. “Bridging the Commitment Capacity Gap”, Center for UN Reform Education, August 2002
A complimentary rapid deployment initiative developed in 1996 was the Multinational Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). This program involved like-minded countries that agreed to develop a unit of 4-5 thousand troops that could be deployed in 15-30 days within the framework of UNSAS\textsuperscript{10}. By June 2007, 16 nations had agreed to participate in the program. While SHIRBRIG has undertaken operations in Sudan, Liberia and Ethiopia-Eritrea, it has not achieved its intended 15-30 day response time. Issues such as insufficient prior training, further negotiations to obtain troops and slow decision making have prevented this initiative from achieving its rapid response objective\textsuperscript{11}.

Deployment Methodology

In the current peacekeeping framework, deployment is entirely dependent on Member States and their willingness to contribute troops. This restricted approach has resulted in an unstructured deployment process, which impacts both timeliness and effectiveness of troop deployment. Systems such as the UNSAS and SHIRBRIG are attempts to provide DPKO with greater planning and strategic control over deployment, however, to date these programs have produced minimal outcomes. The UN is still dependent on Member States for troops, equipment and transport, which is often lacking from a resource perspective.

Rapid and effective deployment is dependent on the ability to be strategic, structured and well-planned when deploying into a conflict region. Currently this is conducted in an ad hoc manner dependent on when troops/equipment are made available and therefore not matched to skill sets and capabilities. Continuing on this path will not improve the quality or reputation of peacekeeping missions, preventing the UN from attaining the most positive outcome possible in conflict regions.

Troop Training

While rapid deployment is crucial, this must not be undertaken at the expense of the quality and preparedness of troops. Troop training is therefore highlighted as a mandatory component of the deployment matrix. Currently troop training is the responsibility of troop contributing countries. Troops gathered from different countries often exhibit varied skill sets and levels of experience, and while training guidelines are provided by DPKO, implementation of these guidelines are often difficult to monitor. Further, troops often lack the skills essential in a crisis environment and are not effectively equipped to undertake missions in such situations.

Effective deployment is dependent on troops attaining uniform training, which can be controlled, monitored and executed through a central body. Troops also require multi-dimensional training in

\textsuperscript{10} SHIRBRIG Website; www.shirbrig.dk
\textsuperscript{11} SHIRBRIG Website; www.shirbrig.dk
relation to gender, peace building, security and cultural factors that are often necessary to understand in conflict situations. A well-trained and a multi-faceted deployment team would enable peacekeeping missions to be more structured, effective and efficient in their operations. Further, enabling peace keepers to diffuse a crisis situation promptly would allow diplomacy and peace building initiatives to have a greater impact.

**UN TROOP DEPLOYMENT TIMEFRAME**

*First Troop Deployment*

Based on a sample of 15 peacekeeping missions (across regions), on average over the last 15 years the UN has taken ‘46 days’ to begin deployment of peacekeepers.

While 47% of missions deployed troops within a 30 day timeframe, troop numbers contribution often fell short of troops authorised by the Security Council resolution. This is illustrated by 9 out of 15 missions, which deployed less than 15% of the authorised force, over a 90 day period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Mission</th>
<th>First Deployment (Troop Numbers)</th>
<th>Authorised Strength</th>
<th>%first deployment vs authorised strength</th>
<th>Deployment Time frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;=1mth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia (UNMIL)</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>12 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda (UNAMIR)</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>2,548</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>27 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi (ONUB)</td>
<td>2,641</td>
<td>5,650</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>11 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola (UNAVEM III)</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>7,610</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>21 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti (UNMIH)</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>8 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic (MINURCA)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>19 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia (UNITAF)</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;=3mths</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)</td>
<td>1,356</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>40 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI)</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>6,240</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>36 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (UNMIS)</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>11,465</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>69 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor (UNTAET)</td>
<td>1,176</td>
<td>10,740</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti (MINUSTAH)</td>
<td>2,127</td>
<td>8,880</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>32 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>53 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;3mths</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)</td>
<td>3,432</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>117 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>154 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Full data on each mission found in Annex A, page 20.

As illustrated by Table 2, while seven of the missions were able to deploy within 30 days, many took up to 90 days and one mission (UNMEE) took even longer, it is important to note that “deployment” of some kind does not necessarily mean that “new” peacekeepers are hitting the ground. In Liberia (UNMIL) while 3,600 ECOWAS troops were ‘re-hatted’ into the UNMIL mission within 12 days (representing 24% of the authorised mission strength), deployment of the entire
force did not occur until 2 years after the initial Security Council resolution\textsuperscript{12}. The peacekeeping mission in Burundi (ONUB) indicated one of the highest first troop deployment rates of 47%. This was achieved through the re-hatting of 2,612 troops from the African Mission in Burundi (Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa). This re-hatting, coupled with low authorisation numbers produced what appeared to be a high initial troop deployment rate.

Many missions took more than 1 month to initiate first deployment:

- The UNTAET mission in Timor Leste (East Timor) took 3 months to send less than 11% of the total authorised force (in contrast to the Australian interim force which, operating under national command deployed in a matter of weeks).
- MONUC in the DRC took over 53 days to get 2% of authorized troops (111) on the ground.
- UNMIS in Sudan, this operation saw only 821 UN troops enter Sudan in the first three months; full deployment took almost one year and was short of the numbers authorised by the SC\textsuperscript{13}.

It is valuable to note that the UNMEE mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea exhibited a high first troop deployment rate of nearly 80%. This was one of the first missions undertaken by SHIRBRIG, with the standby brigade joining the planning team in November 2000 and building resources to deploy 80% of troops by January 2001. While first troop deployment took close to four months, the involvement of a standby unit (Canada, Denmark, Netherlands and Italy) indicates that volume, if not speed, is currently achievable through such a system.

**Final/Maximum Troop Deployment**

Final deployment was examined in accordance to the Security Council resolution that initiated the mission (unless otherwise stated). In many of the peacekeeping missions, troop numbers were either expanded or reduced in consequent resolutions based on the changing security situation.

Mission breakdown by final troop deployment numbers indicated that on average missions took close to ‘\textsuperscript{13}months\textsuperscript{12}’ to reach maximum deployment. Of the 13 missions analysed the shortest period from resolution to near full deployment was three months (eg; MINURCA, Central African Republic and UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone)

\textsuperscript{12} Security Council Resolution 1509
\textsuperscript{13} UNMIS original troop authorization was 11,465
### Table 3: Total/Maximum Troop Deployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Mission</th>
<th>Resolution/ Date</th>
<th>Authorised Strength</th>
<th>Maximum Deployment (Date and Strength)</th>
<th>% Maximum Deployment vs Authorised Strength</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;=1mth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia (UNMIL)</td>
<td>Res 1509 19th Sept 2003</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>14,894 24th August 2005</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>23 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda (UNAMIR)</td>
<td>Res 872 5th Oct 1993</td>
<td>2,548</td>
<td>2,539 22nd Mar 1994</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi (ONUB)</td>
<td>Res 1545 24th May 2004</td>
<td>5,650</td>
<td>5,526 5th Nov 2004</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>6.5 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti (UNMIH)</td>
<td>Res 967 23rd Sept 1993</td>
<td>6,000 (in Res 975; Jan 1995)</td>
<td>6,065 30th June 1995</td>
<td>101%</td>
<td>21 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic (MINURCA)</td>
<td>Res 1159 27th Mar 1998</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>1,245 15th June 1998</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia (UNOSOM I)</td>
<td>Res 775 28th Aug 1992</td>
<td>4,269</td>
<td>947 28th Feb 1993</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia (UNITAF)</td>
<td>Res 794 3rd Dec 1992</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>24,000 U.S. troops, 13,000 from other countries</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3mths</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)</td>
<td>Res 1299 19th May 2000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>12,440 Jul-00</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)</td>
<td>Res 1528 27th Feb 2004</td>
<td>8,240</td>
<td>5,677 20th Aug 2004</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (UNMIS)</td>
<td>Res 1590 24th Mar 2005</td>
<td>11,465</td>
<td>9,880 27th aug 2006</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>17 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti (MINUSTAH)</td>
<td>Res 1542 30th April 2004</td>
<td>8,880</td>
<td>7,519 31st Jan 2006</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>21 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)</td>
<td>Res 1291 24th Feb 2000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>4,388 31st Jan 2003</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>35 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;3mths</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)</td>
<td>Res 1320 15th Sept 2000</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>4,143 1st Mar 2001</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Peacekeeping missions which undertook extensive ‘re-hatting’ and were smaller in scale were often able to achieve maximum deployment within a shorter time span. In general, most missions experienced extensive delays in obtaining troop commitment and achieving the figures authorised within SC resolutions. Examples include:

- Haiti mission MINUSTAH, deployment took over 21 months and the final number of 7,519 troops was more than a 1,000 below authorised strength.
- UNMIL in Liberia took over 23 months
- MONUC in the DRC took over 35 months and only reached 73% of authorised strength
UN TROOP DEPLOYMENT TRENDS

‘Re-hatting’ of Multilateral/Regional Troops
A growing trend in peacekeeping is the re-hatting of existing regional or multilateral personnel in efforts to speed initial deployment. Meaning existing troops on the ground become ‘blue helmets’ and are brought under the UN command structure. From the 15 mission more than 50% or 30K personnel were from re-hatting.

SPOTLIGHT ON DARFUR (UNAMID)

“Sub-Saharan countries have many wars but hardly any helicopters” (The Economist)

In July 2007 the Security Council (Res 1769) authorized a joint African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The Resolution authorised the deployment of 26,000 personnel (police, military and civilian) with operational command and control structures to be in place by October 2007 (3 months after resolution) and deployment by December 2007.

On 1 January 2008, nearly six months after the SC resolution, UNAMID formally took over peacekeeping responsibilities from the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS). However, only a relatively small number of deployments have been made, including a Bangladeshi formed police unit and part of a Chinese engineering unit originally agreed under the heavy support package to AMIS. Further support units are only expected by late March, due to logistical and administrative delays. Egyptian and Ethiopian units are expected to begin deploying by late February. Based on current deployment rates it is unexpected that final commitment will be achieved until the end of 2008.

Key challenges facing UNAMID is highlighted below and outlined in the remaining paper:

- Troop contribution; negotiation difficulties with troop contributors, as some are setting conditions for participation ie; limiting operations to daytime, as well as to slow deployment preparations due to safety concerns, particularly after the recent government attack against the UNAMID convoy
- Logistical constraints; mission is struggling to attain 18 transport and six attack helicopters that it requested. Countries are showing reluctance to commit such assets either due to commitments elsewhere (USA and UK commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq) and “reluctance to endanger such valuable—and vulnerable—assets, particularly in uncertain or unpopular missions”.
- Khartoum over reach; The Khartoum government continues to oppose some non-African contingents equipped with critical engineering and rapid-reaction capabilities from Norway, Sweden, Thailand and Nepal. Important arrangements regarding flight clearances and access to land and water have also faced obstruction.

The current reliance on member nation commitment, mission specific negotiation process and the new phenomena of the host government attempting to influence the composition of peacekeepers are all factors resulting in slow and ineffective troop deployment in Darfur. For the people of Darfur facing a further deterioration of the security situation and threats against their own lives, this 6-12 month long deployment process could be too late!
• Liberia (UNMIL): 3,600 troops from existing ECOMIL mission (Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia)
• East Timor (UNMISET): troops transferred from the UNTAET mission, which mainly consisted of the Australian INTERFET force
• Rwanda (UNAMIR): 130 troops from NMOG II (Neutral Military Observer Group II) of OAU (Organization of African Unity)
• Burundi (ONUB): 2,612 troops from AMIB (African Mission in Burundi)
• Haiti (MINUSTAH): 2,127 troops from MIF (Multinational Interim Force)
• Darfur (UNAMID): 7,000 troops from AU (African Union)
• Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL): troops from ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group)
• Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI): troops from ECOMICI (ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire)

In an environment where faster deployment in peacekeeping has become a crucial requirement in order to protect and save the lives of civilians, the UN has looked to the re-hatting of existing troops to fill this gap. While this addresses the short–term rapid–response issue (from the perspective of Brahimi report), it creates command and control disparity, problems due to different force mandates, troop fatigue, capability gaps and other challenges that may remove the short-term deployment benefits.

In a best practices report of re-hatting in three Western African countries (Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire) it was noted that the “UN was unprepared for an orderly transformation of ECOWAS forces into UN forces, mostly due to the limited time frames…and the absence of true joint planning meant that the planning process was aimed at solving specific short term issues of deployment…rather than taking a broader approach that linked the transition to longer term objectives”.

Set Transfer/Deployment Dates

In a few circumstances Security Council resolutions have included set deployment or transfer dates for peacekeeping missions. This is visible in the four resolutions below:

• Central African Republic (MINURCA): Res 1159; full deployment to occur by 15th April 1998 “Authorizes the Secretary-General to take the measures necessary to ensure that MINURCA is fully deployed by 15 April 1998 in order to carry out its mandate and secure a smooth transition between MISAB and MINURCA”.

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14 UN International Peacekeeping Centre, “Re-hatting ECOWAS forces as UN peacekeepers: Lessons Learned”, August 2005
Haiti (UNMIH): Res 975; full transfer of responsibility from the multinational force to UNMIH to be completed by 31 March 1995. “To take the necessary steps in order for UNMIH to assume these responsibilities as soon as possible, with the full transfer of responsibility from the MNF to UNMIH to be completed by 31 March 199516.”

Liberia (UNMIL): Res 1509; full transfer of authority from ECOWAS by 1st October 2003. “Requests the Secretary-General to transfer authority from the ECOWAS-led ECOMIL forces to UNMIL on 1 October 200317.”

Sudan/Darfur (UNAMID): – Res 1769; full transfer from AMIS by 31st Dec 2007 “No later than October 2007, UNAMID shall establish an initial operational capability for the headquarters, including the necessary management and command and control structures. No later than 31 December 2007, UNAMID having completed all remaining tasks necessary to permit it to implement all elements of its mandate, will assume authority from AMIS18.”

In the case of MINURCA, UNMIH and UNMIL, the inclusion or wording of a specified time period or deadline resulted in troop deployment occurring within the 30 day timeframe, although it should be noted that UNMIH and UNMIL involved transfer of responsibility from an existing mission to the newly authorised operation. In the case of UNAMID, only minimal UN troops have been deployed as at Jan 1 2008, when the mission was transferred from AMIS to UNAMID

**Composition of UN troops**

Troop composition in the majority of missions are provided by nations in the ‘global south’, with a large portion from Asian (Pakistan, India and Bangladesh) and African (Uganda, Ghana, Nigeria) countries. While a significant portion of peacekeeping missions are currently situated in Africa and representation from this region would seem beneficial, the heavy skew of troop contributing countries would indicate an unequal burden upon these nations.

Many troops are sent from some of the poorest nations and are often lacking military training, up-to-date weapons, and with little combat experience. This lack of training and coordination was often visible in missions such as UNAMSIL where the initial deployment of 6,000 troops faced embarrassing situations such as the kidnapping of over 500 peacekeepers and made little ground in tackling a battle-hardened rebel force19.

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19 Stewart G. and Amman J (2007), Black Man’s Grave, Cold Run Books
Developed and “Western” nation involvement in most missions has been minimal from a human resource perspective and when it was strong, often troop provision occurred outside of UN authority (e.g. British troops in Sierra Leone (outside of UNAMSIL) and the Australian INTERFET force in Timor Leste). The impact of a well-trained force similar to the paratroopers sent by the British in Sierra Leone illustrated the significant impact that having contributing forces from the world’s major powers makes in peacekeeping missions (although the UK operated outside of UN controls). As stated by Kofi Annan, “the best peacekeeper is a well trained soldier”\textsuperscript{20}. 

According to the UN, not only is troop availability important but strategic lift and logistic support are also crucial for determining rapid deployment capacity. Air carriers used to transport troops, vehicles and weaponry are not available to all Member States and the involvement of industrialised nations is currently crucial to the process of rapid deployment\textsuperscript{21}.

In May 2006, Australia was able to mount 1,300 troops within a few weeks in Timor Leste, thereby assisting in halting the escalating violence within the newly independent nation. This was a UN authorised mission with military assistance also provided by Malaysia, New Zealand and Portugal\textsuperscript{22}. The possibility for rapid deployment under UN authorisation was also demonstrated in 2006 when 3,000 EU troops deployed to Lebanon within two months. The EU expanded its contribution to 7,500 (of the total 11,563 UNIFIL troops) by Dec 2006\textsuperscript{23}. Both missions illustrate the benefit of having a well trained, organized, technologically superior military force under unified command in attaining rapid deployment within UN Missions.

PEACEKEEPING ‘GAPS’ AND CHALLENGES

According to Jean-Marie Guehenno, head of UN peacekeeping operations, a common problem facing UN Peacekeeping is that “[operations] are seen as a possible panacea to all of the world’s conflicts. In some quarters, as soon as a conflict erupts there are calls for a UN mission to be deployed immediately to contain the problem”\textsuperscript{24}. This paper does not advocate UN peacekeeping to be adopted in all situations to address all conflict resolutions; rather peacekeeping should be a complimentary tool to diplomacy and not utilised in an indiscriminate manner. This paper does however focus on the missions that the UN does determine as vital. As stated in the Brahimi Report,

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{20} Id, pp: 152 \\
\textsuperscript{21} UN Chronicle “Standby Arrangement System: enhancing rapid deployment capacity – Peacewatch”, Spring 1997 \\
\textsuperscript{22} Centre on International Cooperation at NYU, “Global Peace Operations”, 2007 \\
\textsuperscript{23} Id \\
\textsuperscript{24} BBC News, “Head to Head: Good Peacekeeping?” April 19th 2007
\end{quote}
there are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them.25

The specific challenges of rapid troop deployment and the consequent limitations facing peacekeeping missions is what must now be addressed.

1. Rapid Deployment is NOT Rapid

As noted in the research, significant ‘lag times’ existed between Security Council authorisation and troop deployment. In many cases first troop deployment represented a small portion of authorised strength and therefore was neither rapid nor effective in its ability to control the turmoil on the ground. In an attempt to establish clear standards, the Brahimi report set benchmarks for peacekeeping missions, prior to this no standards had been articulated. The report defined ‘rapid and effective deployment’ as the ability to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing an operation, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations26.

The report’s timeframes were considered ambitious and were based on the implementation of recommendations like strengthening standby operations, better training, advanced planning, logistic support and improved mission leadership. Since the release of the report in 2000, political will in adopting these recommendations have been sluggish with minimal progress towards achieving Brahimi’s deployment timelines.

While the 30/90 day timeframe maybe ambitious within the current and even improved UN peacekeeping framework, this benchmark falls far short of being effective in mitigating a humanitarian crisis.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) began to experience escalating violence in 1998, leading to calls for a UN peacekeeping mission. In February 2000, Security Council resolution 1291 initially authorised 6,000 troops27, yet deployment of even the first 100 troops took over two months and troop strength was only at 4,300 by January 2003 (more than three years from initial authorisation)28. It is estimated that 3.8 million people have died during the war, attributed directly to the violence or due to indirect health factors such as fever, malaria, diarrhoea, respiratory

26 Id
27 MONUC authorization was expanded to 15,700 in October 2004 with approximately 16,600 troops in the Congo as of September 2007
28 DPKO MONUC Website; http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc
infections, and malnutrition. These figures also exclude the high level of sexual violence perpetrated against women, increasingly as a weapon of war\textsuperscript{29}.

In such situations of spiralling violence, an emergency response is required where peacekeepers could be deployed within a 48-72 hour timeframe. In the case of the DRC, quick response could have assisted in reducing the number of deaths and upheld the intent of a fragile peace accord. Based on estimates of 31,000 deaths per month\textsuperscript{30}, Brahimi’s benchmark of a 90 day deployment time for complex missions would have left over 93,000 dead.

2. First Response – Ad hoc and Unstructured

The trends illustrated within first troop deployment present some interesting observations. As noted, the initial deployment was often minimal, representing only 2–8\% of the troop strength authorised within the Security Council resolution (with two exceptions). In the case of UNMIH (Haiti) first troop deployment was at 104 (of 6000), representing only 2\% of the authorised force. A minimal and ad hoc deployment approach has resulted in troops being sent as they became available, with little consideration of skill sets, protocols or training, rather than as a strategic measure intended to competently manage unfolding crises.

The current ad hoc rather than intentional approach to deployment highlights a major gap relating to training, cohesiveness and uniformity. In an emergency and humanitarian crisis, initial troops deployed into volatile situations should possess specific skill sets and military response capabilities. This initial group as well as the remaining deployment must be expertly trained with experience in resolving conflicts, an understanding of international human rights law, laws of war, and dealing with gender, national and religious imbalances, which are the underlying causes of many wars\textsuperscript{31}.

As indicated, a significant portion of first troop deployment occurred via ‘re-hatting’ or movement of personnel from one UN mission to another. This not only leads to troop fatigue but also an uncoordinated approach towards peacekeeping. Troops with varied training, understanding of mission mandate and different prior experience reduces the effectiveness and exit potential of missions.

\textsuperscript{29} Harvard Public Health Now, “Congo War Invisible and Deadly Crisis”, February 17\textsuperscript{th} 2006
\textsuperscript{30} The Guardian, “Congo death toll up to 3.8 million”, Dec 10\textsuperscript{th} 2004
Troop Contribution

A major challenge facing peacekeeping missions is the severe dependency on the political will of member nations to contribute trained troops with adequate machinery and other logistical support. The need to negotiate ‘from zero’ for each mission is a major obstacle to achieving rapid and effective deployment.

The examples of Timor Leste (INTERFET), the DRC (Operation Artemis) and Lebanon (UNFIL, phase 2), indicate the potential humanitarian and stabilising impact of a rapidly deployed and well-trained force. All three situations involved the political will to deploy troops but were dependent on regional or post colonial interest for such commitments to materialise. For crisis countries that don’t garner such support, the negotiation process is often long and troop contribution is not easy to obtain.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Taking the challenges of slow deployment, unstructured first responses and irregular troop contribution, the following three recommendations are proposed.

Proposal 1 - UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS)

A UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) seeks to fill the gap between need and capacity so that the UN and its Member States are able to meet the principles outlined within the Responsibility to Protect\(^\text{32}\). The framework of a ‘standing’ or ‘emergency’ peacekeeping force to ensure the prevention of genocide, crimes against humanity and humanitarian disasters\(^\text{33}\) is a key recommendation outlined within this proposal.

A UNEPS initiative would require up to 15,000 military, police, and humanitarian personnel that are individually recruited from a pool of applicants, and would exist on a permanent basis. The standing service would be a ‘first in, first out’ response to crisis and act in a complimentary manner with other UN and regional conflict prevention and peacekeeping initiatives.

The purpose of an emergency service would be to address many of the concerns outlined in relation to rapid deployment, unified and effective training, logistical capability and troop contribution. Firstly, the existence of a permanent service based at UN designated sites with mobile field headquarters would be able to provide ‘rapid’ deployment. Therefore, UNEPS would meet a 48-72 hour response timeframe rather than the current 30-90 day goal stated in the

\(^{32}\) Principles can be obtained in the “Responsibility to Protect Report”, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, [www.iciss.ca](http://www.iciss.ca)

\(^{33}\) Id
Brahimi report. Secondly, trained professionals encompassing military personnel, civilian police, health care practitioners and social workers would provide the expertise needed when responding to diverse needs during a crisis situation. Thirdly, the existence of a permanent standing service would lift the initial risk-factor that causes reluctance among governments to deploy their own national troops/citizens into conflict zones: because a designated service is able to intervene quickly and effectively, this significantly lowers the levels of danger that subsequent troops contributed by Member States will face.

A considerable benefit of a standing service is the long term cost benefit. It is estimated that the UNAMID force in Darfur will cost more than $2 billion in the first year; sustaining the smaller AMIS force costs $23 to $25 million a month\textsuperscript{34}. While the costs of initially establishing a UNEPS would be significant (estimated at $2 billion), the long-term ongoing costs would be far less than the costs that occur when conflicts are left to spiral out of control\textsuperscript{35}.

The Henry L. Stimson Center recently undertook research identifying the deployment gaps in UN police units for peacekeeping missions. Analysis conducted between September 2003 and March 2005 indicated that the average deployment time of UN police was about nine months. To meet this ‘deployment gap’ the centre has proposed a UN Police Reserve (UNPR). The proposal involves the “establishment of a reserve of officers nominated by countries for deployment in UN missions for fixed terms that are interspersed with rotations back to their home services”. Further, retainer fees and other incentives would need to be provided to reimburse the reserve capacity\textsuperscript{36}.

The Stimson proposal, while specifically addressing the police component of UN missions, provides some correlation to the ‘standing/reserve’ concepts that would enable the UN to move from an ad hoc to organised system of troop and police allocation. As stated previously, the cost, timeliness and training benefits reaped through such a permanent standing service would assist the UN in operating more effectively in crisis situations and would reduce the humanitarian impact of conflicts.

**Proposal 2 - Regional Capacity Building**

Regional peacekeeping missions and initiatives have increased dramatically as regional bodies become increasingly involved in this area. The spill-over effects of internal conflicts and cross-border implications have increased the need to solve these problems through regional dialogue.

\textsuperscript{34} The Henry L. Stimson Center, “UNAMID – AU/UN Hybrid Operations in Darfur Fact Sheet”, 2007

\textsuperscript{35} Global Action to Prevent War, “A UN Emergency Peace Service, To prevent genocide and crimes against humanity”, 2006

\textsuperscript{36} Smith, Holt and Durch, “Enhancing UN Capacity to Support Post Conflict Policing and Rule of Law”, The Henry L. Stimson Center, November 2007
Further, due to cultural and ethnic affiliations, regional bodies are sometimes able to initiate operations that are more difficult through multilateral means, e.g. African Union (AU) troops in Darfur and AU troops in Somalia.

Regional initiatives and cooperation with the UN is enshrined in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which encourages “pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.” The role of regional bodies was further reiterated in the Brahimi report, which called on the UN to provide “training, equipment, logistical and financial support, to build regional organizations capacity to contribute personnel to UN-led operations and to lead their own peacekeeping missions.”

Much of the regional activity has arisen within the African continent with bodies such as the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS taking a leadership role in peacekeeping activities. Outside of Africa, the European Union (EU) has also developed its own military capacity for peacekeeping missions, with its deployment into Lebanon in 2006 and the French led Operation Artemis in the DR Congo (May-June 2003). The EU recently deployed ‘Eufor Chad/CAR’, a 3,500 strong peacekeeping mission in Chad and Central African Republic to protect from Darfur. An initial force of 400 is expected to commence on Feb 1st with over 14 member nation participation.

**African Union and Peacekeeping**

In Africa, peace operations have increased significantly with more than 65,000 peacekeepers (UN and African organisations) in various African conflict areas, accounting for nearly 65% of total missions. The African Union (AU) commenced its initial operations in Burundi (2003-04) and since then has launched missions in Somalia (March 2007), AMIS and the Hybrid mission in Darfur, and an electoral mission to the Comoros Islands (May 2007).

In 2003, with the endorsement of the African Chiefs of Defense Staff, the African Union Standby Force (ASF) initiative was launched. The objective of the standing force is to undertake rapid deployment through a phased approach. Initial phases have focused on developing the doctrines and operational procedures with the ambition of developing a peacekeeping force that could be deployed for complex missions by 2010.

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37 UN Charter, Chapter VIII, 1945
39 BBC News, “EU launches Chad protection force” January 28th 2008
The AU has faced its biggest challenge to date with its peacekeeping operations in Darfur (AMIS). As of July 2007, AMIS consisted of roughly 7,200 military and civilian personnel, attempting to carry out an ambitious mandate in a region the size of France. AU troops are often lacking equipment, proper training and logistical capability to effectively monitor the region and protect civilians from human rights abuse. Similar difficulties have occurred in Somalia with the AU authorizing the deployment of 8,000 AMISOM troops to replace the Ethiopian soldiers in Mogadishu. To date only 2,000 troops (form Uganda and Burundi) have been deployed, with many AU contributing countries lacking the willingness to contribute troops.\(^42\)

The growing complexity of missions intended to coordinate with bodies like the UN can further highlight gaps and challenges in a regional approach. Crucial training and logistics support coupled with realistic peacekeeping expectations is necessary if AU missions or other regional actions are to take effect. Further, some critics have voiced growing concerns that regional power blocs may utilize peacekeeping operations as a means of pursing their own political agenda.

While these challenges remain, the unique nature of the AU-UN hybrid force and support for AU peacekeeping ventures by the EU and the US are indications that regional operations are being seen as potential ‘gap fillers’ for the UN. The US has an annual $15 million budget for ACOTA a program that has trained over 17,000 African troops. Further, the EU announced it would give $54 million to AMIS to help during the transition to the hybrid force.\(^43\)

Therefore this paper would recommend financial, logistical and resource assistance to regional bodies such as the AU and ECOWAS to strengthen and sustain current and future peacekeeping operations.

**Proposal 3 - Reinforcing Current Standing Operations**

The Brahimi report provided certain recommendations in the area of standing capacity, directing the Secretariat to “maintain a certain generic level of preparedness, through the establishment of new standing capacities and enhancement of existing standby capacities”\(^44\). The panel encouraged member states to establish brigade size forces similar to SHIRBRIG and incorporate them into the UN’s Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS).

A third recommendation in this report is to urge member countries to establish ‘on call’ lists through UNSAS, to encourage availability of troops/police/civilians for deployment. Existing forces such as SHIRBRIG should be strengthened and more like-minded nations should be encouraged

\(^42\) Mail & Guardian online, “AU seeks to improve conflict-solving”, Jan 29th 2008
\(^43\) The Henry L. Stimson Center, “UNAMID – AU/UN Hybrid Operations in Darfur Fact Sheet”, 2007
to form standby brigades of this kind. This option provides a less ‘risky’ path for member states, as it operates within the framework of an existing UN structure while moving towards rapid deployment.

Following the Brahimi recommendations, DPKO pushed member states to participate and provide quarterly update reports. The UNSAS system also added a fourth level, which identified the readiness of resources to be deployed within the 30/90 day timeframe. However, after two years, only two member states had agreed to join at the fourth level and both lack capacity.

This indicates that while improvements have been made, the system still lacks political will and true participation by member states. This recommendation is therefore dependent on an overhaul of current arrangements and more concrete rather than conditional arrangements.

CONCLUSION

The role of UN peacekeeping has grown in complexity and size since its inception during the 1956 Suez crisis. Peacekeeping missions have been impacted by the changing nature of conflicts, greater politicisation of missions, expansion of peacekeeping missions around the world and UN organisational limitations. These limitations have led to much criticism of the UN’s ability to launch rapid and effective deployment, stem humanitarian crisis and uphold peace and security.

This report has focused on the UN’s ability to undertake rapid and effective troop deployment. This is analysed from the perspective of first troop deployment into a conflict and the maximum deployment achieved in relation to authorised strength. Adequate and timely first troop deployment, which is critical in any emergency and crisis situation, was seen to be highly lacking across most peacekeeping operations. Initial troop deployment often occurred via ‘re-hatting’, which through factors such as troop fatigue, and lack of unified training often proved ineffective in responding to the conflict. The report also highlighted limitations in maximum troop deployment, with some missions falling far short of authorised strength and taking extensive time periods to deploy final troop numbers.

While peacekeeping is not the ‘panacea’ for conflict resolution, this report seeks to provide recommendations to minimise the identified ‘gaps’ to rapid and effective deployment. The recommendations seek to balance costs, political considerations and operational feasibility, in providing solutions to the deployment problem. The proposals for a permanent emergency service (UNEPS), strengthening regional peacekeeping operations and expanding existing UN standing
systems all seek to address the current deficiencies in the UN system and provide feasible alternatives in conflict situations.

Enhancing rapid and effective deployment is crucial and must be addressed with urgency to protect those victimised by war, genocide and crimes against humanity. The UN, member states and regional bodies must “forge unity behind the principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights – wherever they may take place – should not be allowed to stand”⁴⁵, and build towards a reliable and well trained peacekeeping force that can meet this challenge.

APPENDIX A

Summary: UN Peacekeeping Mission Troop Deployment Rates

This report and following tables outline the deployment trends of UN troops within peace keeping missions. The parameter for analysis has been restricted to the Resolution/s that created the UN peacekeeping mission, with authorisation strength and total deployment data based on this resolution. It is important to note that in some cases consequent resolutions have changed the authorisation strength and mandate of the missions, however; this should not impact the nature of the analysis.

Deployment timeframes focus on ‘first’ and ‘maximum’ troop deployment’. This is tabled in the ‘first deployment’ and ‘maximum deployment’ columns which includes; date of deployment and number of troops deployed. In total this report provides detailed analysis on 14 country missions, and 28 sub missions (missions within a country mission, including observer/verification and mission derivations). For the purpose of rapid deployment analysis, 17 of the 28 missions are included in the summary table (observer/verification missions have been excluded)

Data for these charts were obtained from United Nations Security Council Resolutions, Reports of the Secretary-General, and monthly troop contributor charts published by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Data is unavailable for some missions, these will be updated as information becomes available but should not affect the recommendations and trends defined within this report.

⁴⁵ The Responsibility to Protect, Report, pg 19
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Mission</th>
<th>Resolution/ Date</th>
<th>First Deployment (Date and Strength)</th>
<th>Authorised Strength</th>
<th>Maximum Deployment (Date and Strength)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;=1mth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola (UNAVEM III)</td>
<td>Resolution 976 8th Feb 1995</td>
<td>418 1st March 1995</td>
<td>7,610</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola (MONUA)</td>
<td>Res 1118 30th June 1997</td>
<td>3,568 31st July 1997</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia (UNITAF)</td>
<td>Res 794 3rd Dec 1992</td>
<td>1,300 marines 9th Dec 1992</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>24,000 U.S. troops 13,000 from other countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;=3mths</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)</td>
<td>Res 1270 22nd Oct 1999</td>
<td>1,356 (ECOMOG) 1st Dec 1999</td>
<td>6,000 (Res 1270) 11,100 (Res 1289; 7th Feb 2000) 13,000 (Res 1299; 19th May 2000)</td>
<td>7,391 Feb/March 2000 12,440 Jul-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)</td>
<td>Res 1528 Feb 27th 2004</td>
<td>800 ECOWAS troops April 4th 2004</td>
<td>6,240</td>
<td>5,877 20th August 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor (UNTAET)</td>
<td>Res 1272 25th Oct 1999</td>
<td>1,176 Jan 24th 2000</td>
<td>10,740</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)</td>
<td>Res 1281 24th Feb 2000</td>
<td>111 military observers 18th April 2000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>4,386 31st Jan 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;3mths</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
<td>Res 1769 31st July 2007</td>
<td>UN troops (TBA) Dec-07</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>26,000 (TBA) Dec-08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Maximum Deployment**

- **<=1mth**: 15,000, 2,548, 5,650, 7,610, 6,000, 6,065, 1,350, 1,245, 6,000, 7,391, 6,240, 11,465, 10,740, 8,880, 6,000, 26,000, 4,386, 4,300
- **<=3mths**: 7,391, 6,240, 11,465, 10,740, 8,880, 6,000, 26,000, 4,386, 4,300
- **>3mths**: 11,465, 6,000, 26,000, 4,386

**Authorised Strength**

- **<=1mth**: 15,000, 2,548, 5,650, 7,610, 6,065, 1,350, 1,245, 6,000, 7,391, 6,240, 11,465, 10,740, 8,880, 6,000, 26,000, 4,386, 4,300
- **<=3mths**: 7,391, 6,240, 11,465, 10,740, 8,880, 6,000, 26,000, 4,386, 4,300
- **>3mths**: 11,465, 6,000, 26,000, 4,386
APPENDIX B

Country Specific UN Peacekeeping Analysis

1. **Sierra Leone**

The civil war which commenced in 1991 between the Sierra Leone government and the Liberian backed rebels, Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led to over 50,000 deaths and large number of mutilations and sexual violence. Since the end of the war a Special Courts and separate truth and reconciliation commission have been established to punish war criminals and attain some justice and reconciliation for the victims.

**Mission 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date Security Council Resolution was authorised</td>
<td>Resolution 1181 – 13th July 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Mission was Deployed and numbers at deployment</td>
<td>10th August 1998 – first deployment(^{46}): 26 military observers Medical unit (20th Aug 1998) 1st September 1998(^{47}): 56 Military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of Mission</td>
<td>China, Egypt, India, Kenya, Russia, NZ, Pakistan, UK, Zambia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mission 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date Security Council Resolution was authorised</td>
<td>Resolution 1270 – 22nd October 1999(^{48}) Authorised maximum strength of 6,000 military personnel (including the 260 military observers already on the ground)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Mission was Deployed and numbers at deployment</td>
<td>1st December 1999 – first deployment(^{49}): 133 Kenyan Soldiers 223 military soldiers already on the ground (from UNOMSIL) ‘re-hatting’ of 4 battalions of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{46}\) First progress report of the Secretary-General on UNOMSIL S/1998/750 - 12 August 1998

\(^{47}\) Second progress report of the Secretary-General on UNOMSIL, with plans for later phases of deployment S/1998/960 - 16 October 1998

\(^{48}\) First report of the Secretary-General on UNAMSIL, S/1999/1223 - 6 December 1999

\(^{49}\) Malan M, Rakate P & McIntyre A, PEACEKEEPING IN SIERRA LEONE - UNAMSIL Hits the Home Straight, [http://www.iss.co.za](http://www.iss.co.za) – Institute of Security Studies
2. Cote d’Ivoire

The current crisis in Cote d’Ivoire erupted in September 2002 when the rebel group called ‘Forces Nouvelles’ (FN) sought to remove the current government, resulting in ongoing armed conflict between the loyalist security and rebel forces. Their key demands being the removal of President Gbagbo, the holding of inclusive national elections and ending the discrimination facing people of the North (mainly Muslim). The Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) together with the African Union sought to stem the crisis, however its lack of progress caused the issue to be brought to the UN Security Council in Dec 2002.

Mission 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Mission in Cote d’Ivoire (MINUCI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date Security Council Resolution was authorised</td>
<td>Resolution 1479 May 13th 2003 (until Feb 27th)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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50 Second report of the Secretary-General on UNAMSIL S/2000/13
51 The Economist (US) May 20, 2000, Sierra Leone - What to do next? p56
52 Second report of the Secretary-General on UNAMSIL S/2000/13
| Date Mission was Deployed and number deployed | June 23rd 2003\textsuperscript{53}  
26 military liaison officers |
| Composition of Mission | Austria, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Gambia, Ghana, India, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Tunisia and Uruguay |

**Mission 2**

| Mission Name | United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) |
| Date Security Council Resolution was authorised | Resolution 1528 - Feb 27\textsuperscript{th} 2004  
Authorised troop strength 6,240 |
| Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed | April 4th 2004 – first deployment\textsuperscript{54}:  
‘re-hatting’ of the ECOVAS troops from Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal and Togo  
May 25th 2004\textsuperscript{55}:  
Total 3,035  
(half ECOMICI re-hatted contingents)  
20\textsuperscript{th} August 2004 - full deployment from Resolution\textsuperscript{56}:  
5,877 |
| Composition of Mission (June 2004) | Major Contributors\textsuperscript{57}:  
Bangladesh - 369  
Benin - 299  
France – 171  
Ghana – 353  
Morocco – 734  
Niger – 372  
Senegal – 292  
Togo - 289 |

\textsuperscript{53} First Report on the UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire S/2003/801  
\textsuperscript{54} First report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire S/2004/443 – 2\textsuperscript{nd} June 2004  
\textsuperscript{55} Id  
\textsuperscript{56} Second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire - 27\textsuperscript{th} August 2004  
\textsuperscript{57} First report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire S/2004/443 – 2\textsuperscript{nd} June 2004
Other:
China, Brazil, Chad, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Moldova, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe

| Current Situation | Uniformed personnel increased to 9,205
Mandate extended until Jan 2008 |

3. Democratic Republic of the Congo
War commenced in 1998 with Rwandan invasion of DR Congo (also assisted by Uganda, Burundi and Congolese rebels). In April 2003 a power-sharing agreement led to the creation of a transitional government, however, violence has continued in the regions of Ituri and North and South Kivu. The war claimed 3 million lives between 1998-2003 and sexual violence towards women is still perpetrated at a high rate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Date Security Council Resolution was authorised | Resolution 1279 – 30th Nov 1999 establishing MONUC
Authorised: 500 military observers
Resolution 1291 – 24th Feb 2000
Authorised: 5,537 military personnel and 500 military observers |

| Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed (as at 5th June 2000) | 18th April 2000: 111 military officers
5th June 2000: 228 |

| 58 Cilliers J and Malan M, Peacekeeping in the DRC - MONUC and the Road to Peace, Institute of Security Studies |
| 59 DPKO Website: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc |
| 60 Second Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organisation Mission in the Congo – 18th April 2000 |
| 61 Third Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organisation Mission in the Congo – 12th June 2000 |
4. **Liberia**

Civil war in Liberia claimed the lives of almost 150,000 civilians and led to a complete breakdown of law and order. It displaced scores of people, both internally and beyond the borders, resulting in some 850,000 refugees in the neighbouring countries. Fighting began in late 1989, and by early 1990, several hundred deaths had already occurred in confrontations between government forces and fighters who claimed membership in an opposition group, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by a former government official, Mr. Charles Taylor.

UNOMIL was the first United Nations peacekeeping mission undertaken in cooperation with a peacekeeping operation already established by another organization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date Security Council Resolution was authorised</td>
<td>Resolution 1509 – 19th September 2003. Authorised: 15,000 United Nations military personnel, including up to 250 military observers and 160 staff officers, and up to 1,115 civilian police officers. Authority to be transferred to UNMIL by 1st October 2003.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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62 Id
63 MONUC website: [www.monuc.org](http://www.monuc.org)
Composition of Mission (as at Dec 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Contributors:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh – 1,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin - 253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia – 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana – 263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau - 650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland – 308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan – 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali – 252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands - 270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria – 1,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan – 273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines – 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal - 266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Current Situation

Authorised till September 2007 (Resolution 1750 – 30th March 2007)
15,296 total uniformed personnel (as at May 2007)

Extra Information:
On 10 August, the Security Council, by resolution 856 (1993), authorized the Secretary-General to dispatch an advance team of 30 United Nations military observers to Liberia.

5. Sudan

North/South Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Date Security Council Resolution was authorised | Resolution 1590 – 24th March 2005<sup>68</sup>
Authorised: 10,000 military personnel, 750 military observers, 715 police and civilian component |
| Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed | April – 12th June 2005<sup>69</sup>:
115 military staff officers
127 military observers
579 troop-contributing country personnel totalling 821

Full deployment – 27<sup>th</sup> August 2006<sup>70</sup>
9,880 military personnel |
| Composition of Mission (as at 12<sup>th</sup> June 2005) | Major Contributors:
Bangladesh - 126
Nepal - 229
India – 170 |

<sup>69</sup> Report of the Security General on Sudan – 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2005
<sup>70</sup> Report of the Security General on Sudan – 12<sup>th</sup> September 2006
Extra:
Resolution 1547 of 11 June 2004 a special political mission, the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS) - on the north/south conflict – does this need to be covered?

Darfur Conflict

Darfur conflict commenced in 2003 when fighting broke out between the Sudanese government, the government backed Janjaweed militia and rebel groups. This has led to over 200,000 deaths and an estimated 2 million people displaced. Further there has been widespread use of sexual violence as a tool of war.71

Creation of a ‘hybrid AU-UN’ peacekeeping force was accepted by Sudan government in June 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) +UNAMID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date Security Council Resolution was authorised</td>
<td>Resolution 1590 – 24th March 200572 Authorised: 10,000 military personnel and 715 civilian police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resolution 1706 – 31st August 200673 Authorised: 17,300 military personnel and 3,300 civilian police personnel Components agreed on 30th November 2006; authorised strength74:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Light Support package – supporting AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan) by end of June 2007; 105 military staff, 34 police advisors and 48 civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Heavy Support Package – 2,250 military, 721 police and 1,136 civilians second half of 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• AU-UN Hybrid Operations Resolution 1769 – 31st July 2007 Established AU – UN hybrid mission (UNAMID) Authorised: 19,555 military personnel including 360 military observers and liaison officers, a civilian component including up to 3,772 international police and 19 special police units with up to 2,660 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Mission was/will be Deployed and numbers deployed</td>
<td>Current AU Forces – 7,000 October 200775 UNAMID - is to set up initial command and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

71 United Nations and Darfur fact sheet – 18/7/07
73 www.un.org/Depts/dpko
74 United Nations and Darfur fact sheet – 18/7/07
6. **Central African Republic**

Conflict commenced in 1996 with general civil unrest and three army mutinies. The initial mutiny of April 1996 was closely followed by a second uprising in May. The third, and longest, mutiny occurred in November of the same year and the conflict continued to simmer until the deployment of a multinational buffer force in February 1997.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date Security Council Resolution was authorised</td>
<td>Resolution 1159 – 27&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; March 1998&lt;sup&gt;79&lt;/sup&gt; Authorised: 1,350 military personnel, 106 civilians, Stipulated that full deployment must occur by 15&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; April 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed</td>
<td>15&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; April 1998&lt;sup&gt;80&lt;/sup&gt;: 100 troops, transfer from ‘Inter African Mission’ 15&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; June 1998: 1,200 military personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of Mission</td>
<td>Major Contributors&lt;sup&gt;81&lt;/sup&gt;: Burkina-Faso Chad France Cote d’Ivoire Gabon Mail Senegal Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Situation</td>
<td>Mission was completed in February 2000 and the United Nations Peace-Building Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>76</sup> Id  
<sup>77</sup> Hanson S. “Hybrid Peacekeeping Force in Darfur an ‘Unprecedented’ Operation”, New York Times, August 2<sup>nd</sup> 2007  
<sup>79</sup> DPKO Webite, www.un.org/Depts/dpko  
<sup>81</sup> Id
Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) took over to provide assistance in the peace-building effort. The instability in Darfur has caused conflict to spill over into CAR; with 218,000 refugees from Darfur and 90,000 internally displaced Chadians.

7. **East Timor**

The end of Portuguese rule led to internal turmoil that culminated in its annexation by Indonesia in July 1976 and FRETILIN’s (main political party) armed wing, FALINTIL, became a guerrilla force. UN force was created after the violence and human rights abuse perpetrated by the militia (backed by Indonesian security forces) during the 1999 referendum ballot. It is estimated that 24-year occupation by Indonesia led to deaths of up to 180,000.

**Mission 1**
- United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)
- Created by Resolution 1246
- Authorised from 11th June – 30th September 1999
- Mandate focused on organising a fair election process regarding autonomy of East Timor from Indonesia

**Mission 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date Security Council Resolution was authorised</td>
<td>Resolution 1272 – 25th October 1999&lt;sup&gt;85&lt;/sup&gt; Authorised: 8,900 troops, 200 military observers, 1,640 police officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed</td>
<td>International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) – Australian led force authorised by Resolution 1264 (15th Sept 1999)&lt;sup&gt;86&lt;/sup&gt; Approx: 8000 troops January 24th 2000: 185 military observers 991 civilian staff February 2000: 8500 military troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of Mission (as at 31&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Dec 2000)</td>
<td>Major Contributors&lt;sup&gt;87&lt;/sup&gt;: Australia – 1600 Portugal – 768</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Mission of support in East Timor (UNMISET)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date Security Council Resolution was authorised</td>
<td>Resolution 1410 – 17th May 2002&lt;sup&gt;88&lt;/sup&gt; To be established on 20th May 2002 Authorised strength: 5000 troops, 1,250 civilian police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed</td>
<td>Troops transferred from the UNTAET mission on 20th May 2002 Total amount: 4,541 (as at 31st Oct 2002)&lt;sup&gt;69&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of Mission (as at 31&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Oct 2002)</td>
<td>Major Contributors: Australia Japan Korea NZ Portugal Singapore Thailand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Mission 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Mission of support in East Timor (UNMISET)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date Security Council Resolution was authorised</td>
<td>Resolution 1410 – 17th May 2002&lt;sup&gt;88&lt;/sup&gt; To be established on 20th May 2002 Authorised strength: 5000 troops, 1,250 civilian police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed</td>
<td>Troops transferred from the UNTAET mission on 20th May 2002 Total amount: 4,541 (as at 31st Oct 2002)&lt;sup&gt;69&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of Mission (as at 31&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Oct 2002)</td>
<td>Major Contributors: Australia Japan Korea NZ Portugal Singapore Thailand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Mission 4

- United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL)
- Authorised from May 2005—August 2006
- To support the development of critical State institutions and the police and provided training in observance of democratic governance and human rights.

### Mission 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Mission Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date Security Council Resolution was authorised</td>
<td>Resolution 1704 – 25th August 2006&lt;sup&gt;90&lt;/sup&gt; Authorised Strength: 1,608 police personnel, 34 military liaison and staff officers. No troops authorised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed</td>
<td>Date of first deployment – N/A Australia, with 1,500 troops in multi-national force of 2,300 to retain control for military component&lt;sup&gt;91&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>88</sup> DPKO Website: [www.un.org/Depts/dpko](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko)

<sup>89</sup> Report of the Secretary General on the UN Mission of support in East Timor – 6<sup>th</sup> November 2002

<sup>90</sup> DPKO Website: [www.un.org/Depts/dpko](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko)

<sup>91</sup> DPKO Website: [www.un.org/Depts/dpko](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko)
Composition of Mission  
Major Contributors\[^{92}\]: Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Fiji, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone and Singapore

Current Situation  
UNMIT mission was extended until 26\(^{th}\) Feb 2008 – Resolution 1745 (22\(^{nd}\) Feb 2007)\[^{93}\]

8. **Rwanda**
Fighting between the Armed Forces of the mainly Hutu Government of Rwanda and the Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) first broke out in October 1990 across the border between Rwanda and its northern neighbour, Uganda. Attempts were made at peace agreements (such as the Arusha Accord that the UN sought to monitor) However aggression continued with the final attempt by extremist Hutu government to destroy remaining Tutsi community in Rwanda led to 1994 genocide and deaths of around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus\[^{94}\].

**Mission 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Date Security Council Resolution was authorised | Resolution 846 – 22\(^{nd}\) June 1993\[^{95}\]  
Authorised strength: 81 military observers  
Focus; monitor the Uganda/Rwanda border to prevent military assistance from reaching Rwanda|
| Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed | First deployment – N/A  
Full Deployment – September 1993\[^{96}\]|
| Composition of Mission | Major Contributors: Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Hungary, Netherlands, Senegal, Slovak Republic and Zimbabwe |

**Mission 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Date Security Council Resolution was authorised | Resolution 872 – 5th October 1993\[^{97}\]  
Authorised strength: 2,548 military personnel (2,217 troops & 331 military observers) and 60 civilian police; supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff|

---

\[^{91}\] International Crisis Group Report – 1\(^{st}\) September 2006
\[^{92}\] DPKO Website; [www.un.org/Depts/dpko](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko)
\[^{93}\] Id
\[^{94}\] International Crisis Group, Rwanda Conflict Report; [www.crisisgroup.org](http://www.crisisgroup.org)
\[^{95}\] DPKO Website; [www.un.org/Depts/dpko](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko)
\[^{96}\] Id
Focus; monitor and implement the Arusha peace accord

| Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed       | 27th October 1993 - first deployment\(^{98}\): 21 military personnel |
|                                                   | 1st November 1993\(^ {99}\): Incorporation of 81 military observers from UNOMUR |
|                                                   | 130 personnel from Neutral Military Observer Group II (NMOG II) furnished by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). |
|                                                   | 27th December 1993\(^ {100}\): 1,260 military personnel |
|                                                   | 22nd March 1994\(^ {101}\): 2,539 military personnel |

| Composition of Mission (as at 22nd March 1994) | Major Contributors\(^ {102}\): Bangladesh (942), Belgium (440), Ghana (843) |
|                                               | Others: Austria (15), Botswana (9), Brazil (13), Canada (2), Congo (26), Egypt (10), Fiji (1), Hungary (4), Malawi (5), Mali (10), Netherlands (9), Nigeria (15), Poland (5), Romania (5), Russian Federation (15), Senegal (35), Slovakia (5), Togo (15), Tunisia (61), Uruguay (25) and Zimbabwe (29). |

| Current Situation | UNAMIR left in March 1996 Judicial cases continue over genocide participants via the international Tribunal and local courts. |

Extra Information:
- Resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, reduced UNAMIR's strength from 2,548 to 270.
- Resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, imposed an arms embargo against Rwanda, called for urgent international action and increased UNAMIR's strength to up to 5,500 troops. But it took nearly six months for Member States to provide the troops.

\(^{97}\) Id  
\(^{100}\) Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda – 30\(^{th}\) March 1994  
\(^{102}\) Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda – 30\(^{th}\) March 1994

9. **Ethiopia – Eritrea Conflict**

Fighting erupted in May 1998 as a result of a border dispute, causing the displacement of about 250,000 Eritreans and 70,000 deaths from both sides. While a peace deal was brokered in 2000, this collapsed in 2003 due to disputes over the ruling of the border commission. The humanitarian situation in parts of Ethiopia was exacerbated by the severe drought, which led to the emergence of a major food crisis with almost 8 million people affected. Tensions continue with UNMEE attempting to monitor the border.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date Security Council Resolution was authorised</td>
<td>Resolution 1312 – 31st July 2000 Authorised strength; Phase 1 &amp; 2 – liaison officers and 100 military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resolution 1320 – 15th September 2000 Phase 3 – 4,300 troops (220 military observers, three infantry battalions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed</td>
<td>20th September 2000 (Phase 1 &amp; 2): 46 military observers 10th Jan 2001 (Phase 3): 3,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st March 2001: 4,143 military personnel; including 3,236 troops, 121 military staff, 212 military observers and 574 national support elements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of Mission (as at 10th Jan 2001)</td>
<td>Major Contributors: Canada – 550 Denmark – 331 Netherlands – 1,114 Italy - 124 Jordan - 956 Slovakia - 157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

103 UNMEE Website: [www.unmeeonline.org](http://www.unmeeonline.org)
104 DPKO Website: [www.un.org/Depts/dpko](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko)
105 Id

106 Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea – 18th September 2000
107 Progress report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea – 12th January 2001
109 Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea – 18th September 2000
10. **Burundi**

Burundi has been engaged in a civil war marked by ethnic conflict with fighting between the Tutsi-dominated army and armed Hutu rebel groups. The fighting caused widespread civilian casualties since the killing of democratically elected president Melchior Ndadaye in October 1993. The displacement from the conflict and extreme droughts that devastated the nation has “two thirds of the population into extreme poverty and thousands are still facing serious food shortages.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date Security Council Resolution was authorised</td>
<td>Resolution 1545 – 21\textsuperscript{st} May 2004\textsuperscript{112} Authorised Strength: 5,650 military personnel, including 200 observers and 125 staff officers, up to 120 UN police personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed</td>
<td>1\textsuperscript{st} June 2004 – first deployment\textsuperscript{113}: 2,612 troops of the African Mission in Burundi (Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa) and 29 military observers were “re-hatted” as ONUB troops. 23\textsuperscript{rd} August, 2004\textsuperscript{114}: 3,312 troops 102 military observers 5\textsuperscript{th} November 2004\textsuperscript{115}: 5,526 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Situation</td>
<td>ONUB completed its mandate on 31\textsuperscript{st} December 2006\textsuperscript{116}. Final Deployment: 5,665 It was succeeded by the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{110} Burundi Conflict Background – Global Security Organisation; [www.globalsecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org) \textsuperscript{111} Annan K, “Extremely fragile’ conflict-ridden Burundi needs close monitoring”, UN News Centre, 20\textsuperscript{th} March 2006 \textsuperscript{112} DPKO Website; [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/onub](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/onub) \textsuperscript{113} First report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi – 25\textsuperscript{th} August 2004 \textsuperscript{114} Id \textsuperscript{115} Second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi – 15\textsuperscript{th} November 2004
resolution 1719, 25th October 2006 and is still operational.

11. Angola

Since its independence from Portugal the country has been in nearly three decades of civil war between MLPA (elected to government in 1992) and rebel UNITA forces. UN Troops were brought in to monitor the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, which broke down leading to full scale war in 1998.  

Mission 1 – UNIVEM I, II and III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Angola Verification Mission – UNAVEM I,II,III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Date Security Council Resolution was authorised | UNIVEM I; Resolution 626 – 20th December 1988\(^{118}\)  
UNIVEM II; Resolution 696 – 30th May 1991  
UNIVEM III; Resolution 976 – 8th February 1995  
Authorised strength: 7,000 troops, 350 military observers, 260 police observers and 720 civilian staff |
| Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed | UNIVEM I; 3rd Jan 1989 – first deployment\(^{119}\):  
18 military observers  
UNIVEM III; 1st March 1995\(^{120}\)  
418 military observers |
| Composition of Mission UNIVEM III – as at 1\(^{st}\) March 1995) | Major Contributors\(^{121}\):  
Brazil  
Jordon  
Malaysia  
Nigeria  
Zimbabwe |

Mission 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date Security Council Resolution</td>
<td>Resolution 1118 – 30(^{th}) June 1997(^{122})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{116}\) DPKO Website; www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/onub  
\(^{117}\) International Crisis Group, Conflict History; Angola, www.crisisgroup.org  
\(^{118}\) DPKO Website; www.un.org/Depts/dpko  
\(^{119}\) Id  
\(^{120}\) First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) - 5\(^{th}\) March 1995  
\(^{121}\) Id  
\(^{122}\) Id
was authorised

| Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed | 31st July 1997\(^{123}\)
Transfer from previous mission
3,026 troops, 253 military observers
and 289 civilian police observers |
| Composition of Mission (as at 10\(^{th}\) August 1997) | Major Contributors\(^{124}\):
India - 475
Portugal – 358
Zambia – 527
Zimbabwe – 739
Romania, Russia, Bangladesh, Namibia |
| End of mission | February 1999 |

### 12. Haiti

Continued Instability and violence, especially since the 1980s, has seen Haiti become one of the poorest nations in the Americas. Hopes that peace could be achieved with the 1990 of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, were crushed with the military coup and the final removal of Aristide from office in 2004. Since then democracy has been re-established in 2006, however, the huge gap between rich and poor and violent confrontations between rival gangs and political groups has required continued UN presence\(^{125}\).

- Pre mission - Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH)\(^{126}\)
- Appointed jointly by the United Nations and OAS and reporting to the Special Envoy
- Resolution 47/20B authorizing United Nations participation, jointly with OAS
- Deployment began on 5\(^{th}\) March 1993

#### Mission 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)(^{127})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Date Security Council Resolution was authorised | Resolution 867 – 23\(^{rd}\) September 1993
Authorised Strength: 567 civilian police, military construction unit of 700 personnel and 60 military trainers
Resolution 940 – 31\(^{st}\) July 1994
Expanding original mandate and also authorising a multinational force |

\(^{122}\) DPKO Website; www.un.org/Depts/dpko
\(^{123}\) Progress Report of the UN observer mission to Angola – 13\(^{th}\) August 1997
\(^{124}\) Id
\(^{125}\) Id
\(^{127}\) DPKO Website: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
Resolution 975 – 30th January 1995  
full transfer of responsibility from the multinational force to UNMIH was to be completed by 31 March 1995  
Authorised strength: 6000 troops and 900 police officers

| Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed | 1st October 1993 - advanced party: 53 military and 51 police personnel |
|                                               | 11th October 1993: 200 troops prevented from landing in Haiti due to militia attacks. Deployment further hampered by threats and resistance by the military |
|                                               | 19th September 1994: First phase of multinational force deployed |
|                                               | 23rd Sept – 5th Oct 1994: Deployment of advanced UN team to coordinate take over from multinational force. 53 in total. |
|                                               | 15th March 1994: 1,713 military personnel (not part of multinational force)  
791 police from multinational force |
|                                               | 31st March 1994: 4,193 troops transferred from multinational force |

| Composition of Mission (as at 31st march 1994) | Major Contributors:  
Bangladesh – 1050  
CARICOM (Caribbean community) – 277  
Nepal – 410  
USA – 2,336  
Canada - 484  
Pakistan - 850 |

| End of mission | June 1996 |

**Mission 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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130 DPKO Website: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unsmih
| Date Security Council Resolution was authorised | Resolution 1063 – 28th June 1996  Authorised Strength: 300 police personnel, 600 troops and 800 voluntarily funded military personnel |
| Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed | First deployment date – N/A |
| Composition of Mission (as at 15th September 1996) | Major Contributors:  France  Canada  Pakistan |
| End of mission | July 1997 |

**Mission 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date Security Council Resolution was authorised</td>
<td>Resolution 1123 – 30th July 1997¹³¹  Authorised Strength: 250 civilian police personnel and 50 military personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed</td>
<td>Transfer from previous mission¹³²  240 police  50 UN staff  1,125 (outside funded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of Mission (as at 31st Oct 1997)</td>
<td>Major Contributors¹³³:  Canada  Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of mission</td>
<td>30th November 1997</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mission 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date Security Council Resolution was authorised</td>
<td>Resolution 1141 – 28th November 1997¹³⁴  Authorised Strength: 300 civilian police personnel, international and 133 local personnel and 17 UN volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed</td>
<td>December 1997¹³⁵:  90 Special Police Unit  As at 12th Feb 1998:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹³² Report of the Secretary General of the UN Transition Mission in Haiti – 31st October 1997  
¹³³ Id  
| Composition of Mission (as at 12th Feb 1998) | 285 police officers |
| Major Contributors: | Argentina  
| USA  
| France  
| Canada |
| End of Mission | March 2000 |

### Mission 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Date Security Council Resolution was authorised | Resolution 1529 – 29th February 2004  
Establishing a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) prior to the MINUSTAH mission.  
Resolution 1542 – 30th April 2004  
MINUSTAH Authorised Strength: 6,700 military personnel; 1,622 police; 548 international civilian personnel, 154 United Nations volunteers and 995 local civilian staff  
MIF mission to be transferred to MINUSTAH on 1st June 2004 |
| Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed | 1st June 2004  
’re-hatting’ of 2,127 MIF troops  
Brazilian – more than half of contingency  
Canada – remainder of troops until end of July  
31st Jan 2006 – final deployment under resolution  
7,519 |
| Composition of Mission (as at 30th August 2004) | Major Contributors:  
Brazil  
Canada (until 30th July 2004)  
Argentina  
Chile  
Uruguay |
| Current Situation | Mission extended until 15th October |

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13. Somalia

Following the downfall of President Siad Barre in 1991, a civil war broke out in Somalia between the faction supporting Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and that supporting General Mohamed Farah Aidid. The country fell under the control of warlords and clan factions, resulting in nearly 1 million refugees and almost 5 million people threatened by hunger and disease. The UN intervened from 1992 to reduce the humanitarian crisis that was emerging in the war torn nation. Conflict continued with Ethiopian troops entering to support the transitional government against the Islamic militia. Attempts at peace talks continue with hopes of restoring a functioning government. Currently, 1,600 Ugandan peacekeepers are stationed in Somalia.

Mission 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM I)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Date Security Council Resolution was authorised | Resolution 751 – 24th April 1992
Authorised Strength: 50 military observers |
| Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed | 14th September 1992 – first deployment
Number of troops – N/A
28th Feb 1993 - Maximum deployment
947 troops |
| Composition of Mission | Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan and Zimbabwe |
| End of Mission | March 1993 |

Mission 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>Unified Task Force (UNITAF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Date Security Council Resolution was authorised | Resolution 794 – 3rd December 1992
USA led mission – ‘operation restore hope’ (unified command with the
### Mission 3

**Mission Name**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA II (UNOSOM II)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Date Security Council Resolution was authorised**

| Resolution 814 – 26th March 1993 |

**Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed**

| 4 May 1993, budgetary, administrative and military control of the operation were transferred from UNITAF to UNOSOM II |

| Oct 1993: 16,000 peacekeepers from 21 nations |

| Nov 1993: 29,732 soldiers from 29 nations with arrival of over 17,000 additional U.S. personnel as part of a U.S. joint task force. |

| July 1994: 18,790 troops |

**Composition of Mission (July 1994)**

| USA, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Egypt, Nigeria, Botswana, Nepal, Romania, Zimbabwe |

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145 Id
148 Id
149 Further Report of the Secretary General on the UN mission in Somalia – 18th July 1994
14. Lebanon

The relocation of Palestinian armed elements from Jordan to Lebanon in the early 70’s, resulted in ongoing conflict between Israel and Lebanon. In 2000 Israel commenced withdrawal from Lebanon with UNIFIL monitoring the ‘Blue Line’ and UNIFIL troop numbers were reduced. In 2005 hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah reignited, culminating in the July 2006 crisis. Israel invaded Lebanon and Hezbollah fire rockets into Israel territory leading to a UNIFIL mandate revision and troop expansion.

1978 Mission
- UNIFIL was created by Resolution 426 in March 1978 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore security and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its authority in the area.
- First troops deployed 23rd March 1978
- Strength stood at 2,000 troops at August 2006
- After the July/August 2006 crisis, the Council enhanced the force

Mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Date Security Council Resolution was authorised | Resolution 1701 – 11th August 2006
Authorised Strength: 15,000 troops
Mandate and strength changed from original mission due to commencement of hostilities in July 2006 |
| Date Mission was Deployed and numbers deployed | 15th September 2006
3,000 troops
15th October 2006: Maritime Taskforce was operational
Oct – Nov 2006: 10,480 troops
December 2006: 11,500 troops, 1750 naval personnel and 50 military observers |
| Composition of Mission (as at 28th Nov 2006) | Major Contributors:
France - 1608
Germany - 1113
Italy – 2068
Spain – 1290 |

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151 Id
152 Id; Resolution 1701, August 2006
153 Letter dated 1 December 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council – 1st Dec 2006
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other contributors:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia, Turkey, China, Greece</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Current end date of Mission | August 31st 2008 |