Trust and the Development of a United Nations Emergency Peace Service

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Annie Herro and Kavitha Suthanthiraraj

"Trust might be compared to freedom as one of the basic human goods"[1]

Abstract

The United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) is an ambitious reform proposal designed to improve the competence and preparedness of UN peace operations. The latest in a long line of similar proposals, UNEPS would have the mandate and capability to protect civilians and could be a tool to operationalize the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. This paper explores the role that trust and distrust play in the development and acceptance of the UNEPS proposalbased on interviews and workshops with key "target actors" in various regions of the world between 2007 and 2009. Using psychosocial theories on trust and distrust, we build on the literature of constructivist scholars, especially those concerned with transnational collective action. This helps us to explain the different levels of support that UNEPS has received and to suggest how an emerging transnational advocacy network (TAN) might more effectively advocate the idea. We conclude that a "spectrum of trust" would advance interest in, and support for, UN peacekeeping reforms like UNEPS.

Introduction

The United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) is an ambitious reform proposal designed to improve the competence and preparedness of UN peacekeeping operations. The latest in a long line of similar proposals, UNEPS is designed to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity. This paper explores the role that trust and distrust play in the development and acceptance of UNEPS through an emerging Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN).

There are multiple factors affecting how issues gain traction through transnational collectives: persuasion, socialization, legitimacy and communicative action via, for example, material and moral pressure and incentives.[2] These involve processes like shaming governments or linking human rights performance to military or financial aid. Such strategies are not explicitly aimed at building trust but rather forcing or cajoling a particular action from a target actor.

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[1] Solomon, R.C. and Flores, F., (2001). *Building trust in business, politics, relationships and life.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 7

[2] Risse, T., Ropp, S.C., Sikkink, K., (1999). *The Power of Human Rights: International norms and domestic change.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 14; Keck, M. and Sikkink, K., (1998). *Activists Beyond Borders.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 16, 22.

We are interested in the processes surrounding the development of an issue that do not rely on power, pressure-based strategies or material interests but rather focus on trust and trust-building. Consequently, we engage with Finnemore and Sikkink's suggestion that theories in social psychology might help us to understand the different factors that induce persuasion, which they perceive to be central to normative influence and change.[3] This is not to say that other issues mentioned above are unimportant. We believe, however, that there is an unexplored and multi-layered sphere on trust that might assist TANs when considering obstacles and resources to issue or norm emergence.

History of Standing Capacity and UNEPS

The notion of a standing rapid deployment force at the UN is neither new nor revolutionary. While Article 43 of the UN Charter called for the establishment of military forces at the disposal of the UN Security Council (UNSC), representing the first attempt to provide a standby UN rapid reaction force, Article 44 captures the resistance to the idea, giving states the option to contribute forces to UNSC-endorsed operations."[4]

The onset of the Cold War meant that this envisioned UN force did not develop; however, calls for standing UN capacity remained. From 1948 to 1994 more than a dozen proposals were made,[5] ranging from former UN Secretary General Trygve Lie's call for a UN Guard Force,[6] to proposals from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Ronald Reagan's call at the end of his presidency for a "standing UN force – an army of conscience."[7] Sir Brian Urquhart, a former UN Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs and a strong supporter of UNEPS, has also been a longstanding champion of standing UN peacekeeping capacity.

The end of the Cold War and a groundbreaking report entitled "An Agenda for Peace" by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali provided another opening to create a standing capacity. In his report, Boutros-Ghali stated that the "ready availability of armed forces on call could serve, in itself, as a means of deterring breaches of the peace..."[8] As a result, in 1993 the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) was created with the aim of improving the UN's

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[3] Finnemore M. and Sikkink, K., (2001). "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics", *Annual Review of Political Science,* 4, p. 914

[4] United Nations (1945). *Charter of the United Nations.* New York: United Nations.

[5] McCarthy, P.A. (2000) "Building a Reliable Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations." *International Peacekeeping* 7.2, pp. 139-154.

[6] UN Secretary General Trygve Lie in 1948 made a speech at Harvard University proposing the establishment of a UN Guard Force consisting of 1,000-5,000 men at the disposal of the Security Council. He later renamed it a UN Guard and reduced the proposed strength to 300 troops

[7] Heidenrich, John G., (2001). *How to Prevent Genocide.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001.[http://books.google.com/books?id=z7SDOxidP5EC], retrieved 14 May 2009

[8] Boutros-Ghali, B., (1992). *An Agenda for Peace.* New York: United Nations. [http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html], retrieved 14 May 2009.

access to readily available deployment capabilities. UNSAS is based upon conditional commitments by Member States to contribute specified resources within pre-agreed response times for UN peacekeeping operations. The resources agreed upon remain on "stand-by" in their home country, where necessary preparation and training are conducted.

The Netherlands and Canada championed other attempts to realize Boutros Ghali's vision of "peace-enforcement units". Netherlands (1994) proposed a UN Rapid Deployment Brigade and Canada (1995) conducted an in-depth study into the feasibility of rapid reaction capability at the UN. The Canadian study, while calling for the "creation of an integrated model for rapid reaction from decision-making at the highest level to the deployment of tactical level in the field," advised incremental reform rather than the creation of a permanent UN service.[9] In January 1995, the Danish government announced work towards a complementary rapid deployment initiative called Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). This program involved like-minded countries that agreed to develop a unit of 4,000 to 5,000 troops that could be deployed within a 15-30 day timeframe.[10]

These mechanisms, however, resulted in deployment delays and shortages of personnel and equipment, similar to those faced by the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). This is primarily because each participating member state retains the right to decide on a case-by-case basis whether it will provide assistance and troops. Other efforts to develop a reliable capability for rapid action include regional forces and ad hoc mechanisms such as NATO, the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the European Union battle group. These groups, however, are not able to deploy immediately and do not possess the full range of expertise needed to prevent mass human rights violations.

In 2002, an international team of security experts and civil society leaders gathered in Santa Barbara, California to discuss the idea of a standing, individually-recruited, rapid response capacity under a unified UN authority capable of responding effectively to outbreaks of genocide, crimes against humanity or other humanitarian disasters anywhere in the world. Participants were spurred by (1) their interest in ensuring calls for "never again" after Rwanda and Srebrenica were realized, (2) the increasing complexity of UN peacekeeping missions, resulting in major deployment delays and (3) the emerging norm of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, which was launched in the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty (ICISS) report and subsequently endorsed at the 2005 World Summit.[11]

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[9] Government of Canada (1995). "Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability at the United Nations." Ottawa: Government of Canada

[10] SHIRBRIG visit: www.shirbrig.dk. After deployment in four UN missions (the first in 1998), SHIRBRIG closed its doors on 30 June 2009

[11] Interviews with Author: Saul Mendlovitz, co-founder of GAPW and Robert Zuber, Director of GAPW

Deliberations on the framework and details of the UNEPS proposal were significantly advanced in 2006.[12] UNEPS is envisaged as a 'first-in, first-out' service. UNEPS would not be expected to perform the full spectrum of the UN's conflict management functions, but instead would supplement existing UN and regional operations as well as other early warning and preventive capacities. It would be permanent, based at UN designated sites, including mobile field headquarters, and would be able to respond immediately to an emergency. UNEPS personnel would be individually recruited from among those who volunteer from many countries, and so would not suffer the delays of ad hoc forces, the reluctance of UN members to deploy their own national units or gender, national or religious imbalance. Its personnel would be expertly trained and coherently organized to avoid the challenges of a lack of skills, equipment, cohesiveness and experience in resolving conflicts. UNEPS would be a dedicated service with a wide range of professional skills within a single command structure, prepared to conduct multiple functions in diverse UN operations. This would enable it to avoid divided loyalties, confusion about the chain of command or functional fragmentation. It would provide an integrated service initially encompassing 15 000 to 18 000 civilian, police, judicial, military and relief professionals, which would enable it to deploy all the components essential for peacekeeping and enforcement operations.[13]

Methodology

We presented the UNEPS proposal to target actors from different professional, political, religious and cultural backgrounds. These included senior academics, current and former diplomats, UN and government officials, UN mission staff and experts from leading non-governmental organizations working on issues of peace and security. These interviewees were from Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, North America, and Australia.

Our interviews sought to ascertain (1) the extent to which political, cultural, institutional and ideological factors affect target actors support of UNEPS; (2) the relationship between the target actors' support for UNEPS and the characteristics, faming and promoting of the proposal; and (3) the implications this has for the implementation of such a policy proposal.

The development of UNEPS is affected by the perceptions of leaders. As far back as 1965, social scientists have highlighted the importance of examining not just policy issues and the cultures embedded in organizations and other structures influencing the policy making process, but individual leaders as an influential determining force.[14] Contemporary constructivist theorists have used individuals or communities of individuals as units of analysis to understand the

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[12] More details on the UNEPS proposal can be obtained at Johansen, R. (ed.) (2006). "A United Nations Emergency Peace Service: To Prevent Genocide and Crimes against Humanity". Global Action to Prevent War, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and World Federalist Movement

[13] Herro, A., Lambourne, W, and Penklis, D. (2009) "Peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Africa: The potential contribution of a UN Emergency Peace Service" *African Security Review,* 18.1, p. 51

[14] Vickers, G. (1965). *The Art of Judgment: A study of policy making.* London: Chapman and Hall, pp. 15-20

process by which an idea that is held by a small number of people becomes widely accepted.[15]

Transnational Collective Action

The literature on norms and TANs provides valuable insights into how an idea might graduate to the status of a norm. UNEPS builds on the norm of humanitarian intervention, which has already been the subject of much attention in the constructivist literature.[16] Social movement theorists distinguish between "collective beliefs", held by transnational groups, and international norms or standards of appropriate behavior, held by a critical mass of states.[17] This distinction is helpful. It allows us to consider how the UNEPS proposal might gain traction among target actors, which includes members of governments but also other key decision makers.

TANs are key forums through which advocates for reform in international relations can promote and build trust for their ideas. TANs play an increasingly important role in proliferating new ideas and engendering their acceptance. According to Keck and Sikkink's classic definition, a TAN is one form of collective action comprising organizations distinguishable largely by the "centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation."[18] Their goal is to change the behavior of states and of international organizations.[19] The essence of a TAN is the exchange of information, personnel and services. While some are formalized, most are based on informal contacts.[20]

Global Action to Prevent War (GAPW), based in New York, is the current focal-point for all UNEPS-related activities. Its goal is to find practical measures for reducing global levels of conflict and armed violence and utilize its emerging transnational network to achieve these policy outcomes. The organization comprises a network of non-government organizations, university-based policy centers and think tanks in Cameroon, South Africa, Spain, Brazil, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Japan and Australia.

GAPW maintains formal and informal partners, enabling information exchange and dissemination at many levels. This is illustrated, for example, through NGOs and state-based actors promoting UNEPS and Foundations specifically funding the UNEPS project. For example, Japanese Senator Tadashi Inuzuka has incorporated UNEPS into his policy platform. GAPW utilizes its network to persuade states and international organizations to support the UNEPS proposal through: the UN Security Council, UN member-states' missions in New York

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[15] Hall, P.A., (1989). "Conclusion: the politics of Keynesian ideas" in Hall, P. (ed) *The Political Power of Economic Ideas.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 351-391
[16] Finnemore, M. "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention" in Katzenstein, P., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1996
[17] Khagram, S., Riker, J., and Sikkink, K. (2002). *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms.* Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, p. 15
[18] Op. Cit., Keck and Sikkink, p. 1
[19] Ibid., p. 2
[20] Op. Cit., Khagram et al. p. 6

(and other countries), governments of various member-states; and UN agencies such as DPKO and UN Development Program (UNDP).

Over the past five years, GAPW's UNEPS partners have lobbied governments in various regions to support the UNEPS proposal. GAPW's advocacy has involved both direct discussions with governments as well as regional workshops in countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan and Cameroon. These efforts have resulted in some legislative action through Resolution 213 of the US House of Representatives and the adoption of a bill in the Japanese Diet.[21] Despite such advocacy, the UNEPS proposal has been met with some resistance, hence this enquiry.

Trust and Distrust

Robert Putnam and Francis Fukuyama believe that trust is essential for political and economic performance in society.[22] While there is no precise definition of trust, Weber and Carter argue that it is both a moral and cognitive force: "the belief that the other will take one's perspective into account when making a decision and will not act in ways to violate the moral standard of the relationship".[23] Others suggest that trust occurs when "the acts, character or intentions of the other cannot be confirmed".[24] Trust therefore involves an element of risk and is relational: it includes the truster and the trustee.

There is no one "measure of trust". As such we draw upon a variety of trust theorists in the social sciences to help us explain our observations. McKnight and Chervany's account of processes by which initial trust is built is helpful in explaining the relationship between UNEPS and the target actors.[25] Based on their analysis of trust literature, McKnight and Chervany develop categories of trust that are conceptually distinguishable but interrelated. We use this model, which is based on rigorous research, as an analytic tool to help us understand our observations.

We refer to the following constructs in our discussion: (1) "trusting beliefs" or the belief that the

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[21] Resolution 213 of the U.S. House of Representatives (March 2007), Representatives introduced a proposal on UNEPS, regarding it as a national security interest, and called for its support to buttress UN peacekeeping. Addressing the millions of dollars spent on humanitarian catastrophes dealing with the aftermath of genocide, the resolution called on the implementation of UNEPS as a necessary tool to strengthen the UN's preventive capabilities. "The United States," it declared, "should use its voice, vote, and influence at the United Nations to facilitate and support the creation of a United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS)." Terror Elimination Bill, Japanese Diet (January 2008), Upper House of the Japanese Parliament adopted a proposal, which included articles specifically addressing the concept of "Responsibility to Protect" and the establishment of a new UN service "capable of immediately taking necessary measures to respond to threats to international peace and security."

[22] Putnam, R.D., (1993). *Making Democracy Work.* Princeton: N.J.: Princeton University Press; Fukuyama, F., (1995). *Trust.* New York: Basic Books.

[23] Weber, L.R. and Carter, A.I. (2003). *The social construction of trust.* New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, p. 3

[24] Seligman, A.B. (1997). *The problem of trust.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 21

[25] McKnight, D. H., and Chervany, N. L. (2006). Reflections on an initial trust-building model. In R. Bachmann & A. Zaheer (eds.), *Handbook of Trust Research.* Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.

other party has favorable attributes including benevolence, honesty, competence and predictability; (2) "trusting intention" or the willingness to depend upon the other party; (3) "disposition to trust" or the assumption that others are mostly trustworthy; and (4) "institutional-based trust" or the beliefs that particular institutions are conducive to trusting. To explain respondents' distrust of UNEPS, we invert McKnight and Chervany's model and argue that the absence of such constructs engender distrust in the UNEPS proposal.

While we rely heavily on McKnight and Chervany's framework, it does not help to clarify all our observations. It fails to include historical, social and cultural perspectives on distrust. Furthermore, McKnight and Chervany do not offer an account of the relationship between trust and power. Farrell is helpful in this regard. He argues that there is a "gray zone" when "substantial (but not overwhelming) asymmetries of power" exist which permits trusting relations. But he claims that it is almost impossible to be in a trusting relationship with someone who is so powerful that they cannot make credible commitments to you".[26] Finally, we use the Solomon and Flores' classic definition of "authentic trust" to help explain the attitudes of those in our final type of response. Authentic trust encompasses distrust and seeks to transcend it. This is not through blind optimism but a deep commitment to a relationship with a high-level of self-awareness.[27]

Spectrum of Trust

We have selected three themes from our interviews in which trust emerges as a key factor in the development and acceptance of the UNEPS proposal: issue characteristics; framing; and political or moral entrepreneurs. These are not (always) distinct and unrelated phenomena but can often be understood as mutually reinforcing. We try to unveil the dynamics between target actors' perspectives on these themes through a spectrum of trust comprising three ideal types: distrustful, distrustful with trusting intentions and authentic trust.

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[26] Farrell, H., n.d. "Trust, Distrust and Power". Forthcoming in Hardin, R. *Distrust* (Russell Sage Foundation), p. 4
[27] Op. Cit. Solomon and Flores, p. 92

Spectrum of Trust

Distrustful	Distrustful with Trusting Intentions	Authentic Trust
• Distrust at all levels • Lack trusting intentions (desire to overcome distrust)	• Historical, dispositional and institutional distrust • Support for a variation of UNEPS based on its percieved competency, predictabilty, benevolence and honesty	• Trusting • Aware of others' distrust • Support for slight modifications of the proposal to maximise support of target actors

Issue Characteristic

Framing

Political Entrepreneur

First, theorists suggest that the characteristics of an issue help to determine the international support it receives and are a powerful factor in effecting normative change.[28] We use the term "issue characteristics" to encompass the institution to which an issue is aligned if target actors perceive them to be inseparable to the issue itself. The United Nations, in the case of UNEPS, is an example of such an institution. Studying the early stage of issue emergence, Carpenter argues that this theory does not explain why TANs adopt certain issues and not others.[29] Since we are examining how to generate support for UNEPS from the perspective of an emerging TAN, we suggest that examining issue characteristics through a trust spectrum sheds some light on this concern.

Second, we consider framing which, according to Tarrow, are ways of packaging and presenting ideas.[30] Keck and Sikkink explain that TANs frame issues so that they fit particular institutional

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[28] Nadelmann, E., (1990). "Global Prohibition Regimes: the Evolution of Norms in International Society". *International Organization* Vol. 44, pp. 479-526; Price, R., (2003). "Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics" *World Politics* 55, pp. 579-606
[29] Carpenter, C., (2007). "Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue Emergence and Non emergence in Transnational Advocacy Networks"*, International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 51, p. 116
[30] Cited in Op. Cit., Khagram et. al., p. 12

venues, existing ideas and ideologies in a historical setting[31]. Identifying which frames invoke trustful or distrustful postures might help to further maximize interest in, and support of, UNEPS. This also might also assist us in explaining why some respondents supported certain frames even when they were inconsistent with local norms and practices.

Third, we consider the presence of political entrepreneurs or individuals who initiate a campaign and lobby to draw awareness to an issue is another common theme of the literature[32]. Keck and Sikkink highlight the importance of "actor characteristics" which include both the individuals and institutions in the TAN plus the target actors.[33] A central element of Acharya's theory of norm localization is the presence of "willing and credible local actors or local proponents who are not seen as outside stooges".[34] He argues that regional networks rather than individuals are more likely to facilitate norm diffusion.[35] This guides us to examine the extent to which trust is apparent in the relationship between the TAN and the target actor and to consider how, where trust is weak, it can be strengthened.

Distrustful

Respondents whom we place in the distrustful category exhibit distrust in the UNEPS proposal at all levels cited above (issue characteristics, framing and entrepreneurs).[36] The form this distrust takes varies, as do the reasons for the distrust. The respondents are not only distrustful of the proposal, they express little desire to overcome this distrust. In other words, they lack trusting intentions.

Issue Characteristics

The first issue characteristic we address is UNEPS' mandate. Several respondents from Indonesia stressed that they would be suspicious that UNEPS would "take sides" in a conflict rather than operate from a purely humanitarian impulse. A former Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, France and other Western nations said, "A peacekeeping force is a peacekeeping force. It's not a war-fighting machine. The behavior should also be like it…it has to be humanitarian in the approach. Soldiers don't know how to do this."[37] He is referring to the kind of neutral and impartial approach of the ICRC that does not discriminate between victim and perpetrator in their quest to alleviate suffering. A journalist from Indonesia who accompanied former President

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[31] Op. Cit., Keck and Sikkink, pp. 201, 204.
[32] Op. Cit., Carpenter, p. 114
[33] Op. Cit., Keck and Sikkink, pp. 207
[34] Acharya, A., (2004). "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism. *International Organization* Vol. 58, pp. 251
[35] Ibid., 265
[36] In two cases, respondents' fail to comment on one aspect of the proposal
[37] All interviews were conducted by the authors between 2007-2009 either over the phone in the case of respondents in Latin America and Africa and in person in the case of respondents from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia and North America.

Suharto on his foreign visits shared this perspective. She claimed, "people always end up taking sides. With the referendum in Timor, the sympathy is already for the referendum, towards breaking away from Indonesia. There is always that suspicion that they [the interveners] are conspiring to influence the people." The implication is that, for these respondents, UNEPS would only be trusted if they could ensure it would be neutral which, they imply, is impossible.

Another issue characteristic that ignited suspicion was UNEPS' composition. Responding to UNEPS' robust military capacity and individually recruited personnel, a Senior Associate at a UN Reform monitoring agency said UNEPS would be a "drastic departure from the status quo as it reflects an underlying and systemic reluctance of countries to hand over major power to any foreign entity, be it the Security Council, the General Assembly or the Secretary General, which individually they cannot control and which, if in charge of a military force could commit governments to risky situations that could be counter-productive to their national interests".

Furthermore, respondents' level of trust in the UN is an important indicator of support for the proposal. Based on his experience working at UN missions in Chad and Darfur, a Central African government official noted that he could not separate UNEPS from the UN. He said: "UN International peace and security role is far below expectations in terms of timing and quality of its actions. The procedures as well as the reactions of Member States in times of need is too low to be of importance and impact". His distrust stemmed from operational concerns over communications, training and resources as well as a politicized Security Council with members that "are influenced by their own interests and not forward thinking." Distrustful of the UN for similar reasons, a former Indonesian diplomat said: "The UN is seen in Indonesia in light of Timor. The 'Kujaim', in Indonesian, the victim of machinations." He is referring to the Security Council's endorsement of the Australian-led intervention force in East Timor in 1999, which led to its independence from Indonesia. This, he suggested, was a betrayal for his country. This sentiment was also voiced by a former UN Under Secretary General (USG) who had worked in the UN for 25 years: "anybody with the least knowledge on the Security Council procedures will tell you that it is ineffective and inconsistent. It is unnecessarily slow, takes months of discussion and in most cases takes off with far less resources than needed to make any significant impact". His experience interacting with Security Council Members tainted his view on the effectiveness of this UN body.

A Director of an influential military association in Australia was also distrustful of the UN, especially the General Assembly and, by extension, UNEPS: "The UN won't achieve anything until the democracies are in a majority in the General Assembly". This retired military officer who had served in a number of UN peace operations was not concerned about the politicization of the UN but rather which countries should wield power. He also argued that UNEPS' personnel would not be committed to its mandate: "What motivates people to lay down their life? Not the UN because it's so corrupt."

Framing

Since one of the ideational underpinnings of UNEPS is R2P, advocates often frame the proposal around this emerging norm. This was unhelpful, however, in gaining support from many respondents. For the former Indonesian diplomat, framing UNEPS around R2P further diminished his trust in the proposal. He said: "R2P means a developed country intervening in a developing country. It has no credibility because of Mr. Bush. What we see is the UN using force to introduce democracy."

This fear that state sovereignty will be compromised and subject to 'western' power politics in the name of R2P is palpable throughout many interviewee responses. A former government official in a South African policy institute claimed: "it's a tool being developed for meddling in our affairs".[38] UNEPS, he argues, could become an instrument by which powerful states would leverage their considerable influence at the expense of weaker states. "I strongly agree that states should protect their citizens, but we don't need others telling us how to do this and this concept isn't working properly yet". For many of the respondents, this concern was solidified after the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan with humanitarian intervention becoming linked with the war on terror and state failure. ICISS co-chair Gareth Evans argued that the "poorly and inconsistently argued humanitarian justification for the war in Iraq, almost choked at birth what many were hoping was an emerging new norm justifying intervention on the basis of the principle of responsibility to protect".[39]

Political Entrepreneur

Amongst respondents in the "Distrustful" category, State, individuals or institutions championing UNEPS appeared to have little effect on levels of trust for the proposal.

Explaining Distrust

What is the reason for respondents' rejection of the proposal? It would be easy to explain it in terms of their perceived threat to state sovereignty but this masks the complexity of their concerns. A trust framework highlights the different levels of suspicion and leads us to consider some of the causes of their concerns.

Respondents' institutional distrust in the UN was related mainly to the Security Council and the General Assembly. The absence of three trusting beliefs—competence, predictability and honesty—appeared to influence their position on the viability of UNEPS. The respondent from Central Africa emphasized that UNEPS would inherit many of the shortcomings of the UN in relation to the incompetence of the Organization. He questioned if UNEPS would have been authorized by the Security Council to go into Darfur any sooner to stop the bloodshed.

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[39] Evans, G. (2004). "When is it Right to Fight?". *Survival* 46:3, pp.59-82

Conversely, the Australian respondent explained his view of the UN's incompetence in the context of the alleged corruption of the organizations by "hoodlum countries". Furthermore, a former USG emphasized the inconsistency of the Security Council's procedures, suggesting that its lack of predictability affects his support for the proposal. Finally, for the former Indonesian government official, his perception that the UN is a dishonest organization influenced his views on the proposal.

In addition to the institutional distrust, these respondents also appear to lack a disposition to trust. This refers to trust in the personality of the trusting party. A trustor with a disposition to trust has a general tendency to trust others across situations or has a general faith in human nature[40]. In contrast, the views of our respondents seem to reflect Thucydides' realist maxim— "the strong do as they wish while the weak suffer as they must". For these respondents, the power dynamics within the international society—indeed within human nature—leaves no room to trust reform proposals like UNEPS. We see a glimpse of this disposition with comments such as: "It all comes down to interest, Rwanda for example. There were no interests there, no oil etc. It's [UNEPS] a great idea but the whole UN was a great idea" or "In the end, we are all nationalistic. Maybe when there is an attack from Mars then we will become more united."

Historical, cultural and political suspicions of the institutions, states and individuals promoting "humanitarian intervention", UNEPS and R2P also helps to explain some respondents' positions on UNEPS. In the case of the Southeast Asian respondents, this appears to stem from perceptions that TANs, the UN and certain states supported Timor's claim for independence as well as separatist movements in Aceh and West Papua. In the case of the African respondents, distrust appears rooted in their history of colonialism and vestiges of paternalism.

This is perhaps the most difficult type of respondent to convince of the need for a UNEPS. They lack trusting intentions and faith in the competence, predictability and honesty of the UN. They show signs of a distrustful disposition. Having said that, structural assurance safeguards, which act like a 'safety net' to support trusting intentions, might be helpful to building institutional trust. UN Security Council reform could contribute to this. Furthermore, legal safeguards surrounding humanitarian intervention could also foster trusting intentions. As international lawyer, Hilary Charlesworth suggests, to prevent politically motivated interventions couched in R2P language (a central concern of these respondents), and to increase the political feasibility of UNEPS, terms such as "genocide", "crimes against humanity" and "prevention" might need further legal clarification.[41]

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[40] McKnight, D.H. and Chervany, N.L. (1996). *The Meanings of Trust.* University of Minnesota, p. 37
[41] University of Sydney and Caritas Australia (2008). "The Right to Protection: whose responsibility and how?", Workshop, 3 September.

Distrustful with Trusting Intentions

Respondents' distrust in this category traversespolitical and cultural perspectives on distrust, dispositional distrust and institutional distrust. However, respondents exhibit some trusting intentions. Grounds for trusting intentions were based on some of UNEPS' original properties but predominantly on their projections of what UNEPS might look like. Trusting beliefs— competence, predictability, benevolence and honesty—were key contributing factors to increasing respondents' trust. Such constructs were especially apparent in the context of framing and issue characteristic. Predictability and honesty also seemed instrumental to ensure that UNEPS' political entrepreneurs were trustworthy.

Issue Characteristic

While UNEPS would include military and police to undertake security functions, it places equal emphasis on non-military capacities. Certain UNEPS personnel would be trained in mediation, conflict resolution and monitoring skills, enabling them to perform peace-building as well as peacemaking functions.

A UN expert at a Latin American NGO noted: "a military force will always be viewed with suspicion, but a multi-disciplinary service including mediators, civilian police, health professionals, may allow some room for dialogue". In a recent conference held in Brasilia (Brazil) by GAPW, these sentiments were reinforced. A Brazilian government official who highlighted the need to "find equilibrium between state sovereignty, the key principle of the Inter-American system, and support for humanitarian intervention" affirmed that the proposal's focus on integrating military with police and civilian components makes it "more palatable". We see his intention to move beyond the strict state-centric definition of sovereignty towards a more human-centric version.

A former UN Commander of MINUSTAH (UN Mission in Haiti) stated that while he questioned the "willingness of Latin American nations to support such a proposal", he acknowledged its superiority to current peacekeeping operations: "peace operations are too militaristic, initially the purpose of MINUSTAH was war fighting, but later we realized that most crimes were committed on a community level requiring a less militaristic approach and incorporating civil society elements".

While concerns about UNEPS' mandate arose among some respondents in this category, they were tempered by suggestions to overcome this distrust. A senior representative of the Australian Defense Forces and a senior policy analyst at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) were both skeptical about a UNEPS that would respond to R2P crimes because of the absence of trust between states at an international level. They argued, however, that a mechanism

that would respond to natural disasters at regional level might pave the way for the creation of a service with an accepted mandate to prevent mass human rights abuses. A senior figure in the Australian Department of Defense, who was impressed with the skills of certain Southeast Asian neighbors in responding to recent tsunamis and earthquakes, argued that the creation of a standing regional peace service that would respond to natural disasters is a crucial first step to ultimately developing a means of reacting to gross human rights violations. He says: "If you start with genocide, you probably won't do it; but if you start with humanitarian aid, it could go a long way towards establishing the instrumentalities, the processes, trust that could flow into the other…it's not about security, it's not about who's superior… [it is] a recognition that working together is a smart thing to do that doesn't cause embarrassment…and the loss of face".

A Genocide expert from a European Human Rights Center remarked, "UNEPS and other standing capacity proposals may strike greater resonance regionally as they are perceived as having greater effectiveness without the burden of UN structures." He also said "regional groups could possibly operate with more credibility and flexibility than the UN, due to mistrust of the Security Council and its imperialist actions". This respondent elaborated that UNEPS could only be housed in the UN if there was Security Council reform, which in his opinion would be undesirable: it would "stalemate the whole situation…relaxing the rules are worse than the benefits". He believes that while the status quo should be retained at the UN, he was open to the potential for a regional standing capacity because it would not disrupt the global balance of power.

Some respondents who advocated a UNEPS that would be housed within and deployed via regional centers highlight the importance of local/regional knowledge, cultural/political awareness and 'local faces for local problems'. For example, one senior academic from a leading Jakarta-based security studies think-tank said that having "white faces" (understood as American, Australian or European) in a peace operation would always evoke notions of neo-colonialism.

These respondents maintained that regional peacekeeping operations are not as burdened with legacies of Western imperialism, regional unfamiliarity or the Security Council's political maneuverings.[42] A representative of the Brazil country mission to the UN noted that Security Council decision-making was unequal with developed countries primarily involved with peacekeeping decisions, but it was developing countries that implement the mandate and contribute the troops.

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[42] The need for regional stability and concern about spillover effect has prompted certain regional bodies to pursue rapid reaction capacities. Operational regional peacekeeping bodies like the African Union (AU), European Union (EU) and Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS) are all important players in fulfilling aspirations of civilian protection, peace and stability. These regional groupings have aided overstretched UN peacekeeping operations, providing stopgap measures to remedy some of the UN's funding and personnel limitations.

Others felt that a UN-Regional Hybrid might overcome distrust in the UN, while retaining the legitimacy the organization brings to peace operations. An academic at a leading Indonesian government-funded sciences research centre said, "People trust the UN to the extent that it's not seen to be dominated by a single super-power". This regional UNEPS, she envisaged, would follow UN best practice in peace operations. Given the current state of ASEAN, she suggested that there might be some form of sub-regional organization made up of a coalition of the willing to cooperate on regional maritime, security and trade issues. Echoing this preference for a limited UN role in peacekeeping in the region, a former Secretary-General of ASEAN argued that the attitude of people in Southeast Asia is that the "the UN is a valuable part of the international community" as a place to "formalize the quid pro quo, obtain a settlement or get endorsement for a solution that we find for our self". The former Secretary-General sees the role of the UN to legitimize regional solutions rather than empowering it to generate and implement solutions to conflict. This suggests that not all decision-makers in Asian support Archarya's observations that Asian governments generally accept the UN as the primary agent of peace operations and humanitarian protection rather than regional organizations.[43]

Framing

Like the previous category, respondents revealed their distrust of R2P as a principle and as a frame for UNEPS. The former Secretary-General of ASEAN said: "There are certain words or concepts in international relations which immediately arouse a defensive response. R2P is one such word". This relates to his above-cited concerns that a permanent UN service could be perceived as interfering in the politics of a given country rather than acting with impartiality and neutrality. A senior policy analyst at CSIS who has worked on security policy between Australia and Indonesia also highlighted the suspicion surrounding R2P: "R2P is problematic because it's so selective".

The former Secretary-General suggested framing UNEPS as either an ICRC-kind response unit, while the CSIS analyst suggested framing it as a mechanism to react to natural disasters. Concern for the protection of vulnerable groups appear to motivate the first respondent to consider alternative frames: "What we need to say is I'm not interested in pushing R2P as a concept but what we must all be committed to is basic decency, to look after our people affected by conflict and natural disaster. Is this too much to expect of a human being? What we are talking about is [a response] of the Red Cross kind. We are here because of our human concern." The latter believed that cooperation between Southeast Asian states to respond to natural disasters might eventually foster the trust to create a UNEPS. Citing practical reasons, he said: "in the future,

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[43] Acharya, A. "Conclusion: Asian norms and practices in UN peace operations". *International Peacekeeping,* 12:1 p. 151

critical security concerns facing Southeast Asia will be natural disasters. Countries in the region have a common understanding that we need to work together to react."

Political Entrepreneur

While respondents had various concerns about aspects of UNEPS including its mandate, composition and UN imprimatur, their suggestions on a suitable political entrepreneur to champion the proposal are encouraging. One respondent from a science research institute said that the World Federalists Movement's (WFM) name on the front of the 2006 UNEPS publication would hinder the support the proposal received among government officials who are fearful of an autonomous UN. Whereas, she argued, if the proposal were perceived as an evidence-based intellectual exercise seeking to report on their and others' perspectives, this would increase the trustworthiness of the proposal. It is of little concern whether the WFM aims to achieve an autonomous UN (which it does not), but rather what this organization signifies to the target actor.

Target actors' perception of the state(s) representing a proposal like UNEPS is closely linked to their support. A former Indonesian diplomat said that if China and India were "participating fully" in the development of the proposal perhaps he would support it—"then it wouldn't be perceived that it is a Western-controlled entity". This means that respondents trust that China's decision will be consistent with his/Indonesian's interest. Conversely, an influential Malaysian academic and peace activist who has contributed to national and global policy reforms argued that the only way the Malaysian government, or any Southeast Asian government for that matter, would take the UNEPS proposal seriously is if it were presented to them by a few committed, middle-sized governments. He noted the suspicious that would be generated by powerful nations such as China or the US controlling a UNEPS and the consequent distrust this would create for their respective allies. Putting smaller states in charge, he claimed, would increase support for the proposal.

We see the importance of consultation in generating new standing capacity proposals with responses to the 'Friends of Rapid Reaction'—a group of nations that championed previous UN peacekeeping reform proposals. Many members of the non-aligned movement, including some of the biggest troop contributing countries, felt excluded and undervalued. In October 1996, for example, Pakistani Ambassador Ahmad Kamal said that he "supported the concept of a rapid deployment headquarters team but was concerned at the action of a self-appointed group of 'Friends of Rapid Reaction' operating without legitimacy, and having half-baked ideas developed without broad consultations with the countries most concerned".[44] Such attitudes led some members of the movement to be uncooperative and question the legitimacy of alleged western-

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[44] Department of Public Information (1996). "Daily Highlights". New York: Central News Section, United Nations October 25, 1996.

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centric arrangement such as SHIRBRIG, which was based in Denmark and comprised mainly western troops.

Explaining Distrust with Trusting Intentions

Like those in the previous category, there were hints of dispositional distrust among these respondents which appeared to influence their perceptions on the UNEPS' characteristics. They still, however, exhibited trusting intentions, which seemed to be triggered by at least one trusting belief: competence belief or the perceived competence attached to UNEPS' wide range of professional skills. Furthermore, respondents from Latin America clearly indicated that they would place greater trust in civilian components of UNEPS rather than the military ones.

Respondents who suggested altering UNEPS' mandate to respond to natural disasters as a precursor to manmade disasters used a neo-functionalist approach—distinguishing between a vision for UNEPS and the strategy to achieve this—to consider ways of fostering trusting relations between target actors and the proposal.

Respondents in this category share the liberal institutionalist view that institutions have the potential to foster cooperation between states by encouraging cooperative habits, monitoring compliance and sanctioning defectors.[45] Respondents indicated a shift from rigid institutional distrust to some institutional trust when discussing regional or UN-regional hybrid alternatives of UNEPS. While there is disagreement surrounding the extent to which they believe the UN is capable of achieving cooperation in terms of implementing UNEPS, many believe that the organization has some role to play. For some respondents, regional institutions represented sufficient competence and predictability to allow them to explore UNEPS' potential.

Historical and political distrust in humanitarian intervention appeared to trigger respondents' lack of support for R2P. Their suggestion to reframe UNEPS in terms of natural disasters was motivated by benevolence (concern about the welfare of others) or competence which refers to one respondent's interest in strengthen the capacity of the Southeast Asian region to respond to crises.

Advocacy networks and individuals that displayed greater regional sensitivity, representation and awareness of cultural, political and religious subtitles attained greater levels of trust among target actors. Trust constructs that appear to stimulate respondents' interest in UNEPS include predictability and honesty. Respondents wanted to know that the individuals, institutions and states influencing the development and implementation of UNEPS could be trusted to act in their interests and would honor their commitment to create a service to prevent mass human rights violations.

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[45] Burchill, S., et al. (2005). *Theories of International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 64-5

Authentic Trust

Respondents in this category were committed to the original properties of the UNEPS proposal, though were mindful about how they would be received by others. This type of response resembles what Solomon and Flores call "authentic trust". This variation of trust views betrayal as neither surprising nor devastating, though still chooses to trust. Thus respondents' are constituted as much by doubt and uncertainty as by confidence and optimism.

Issue Characteristic

A respondent from the UN Association in Australia and who had previously served as a director in the UN Secretariat lent his support to UNEPS and its principles. He and several other respondents believed that the UN is both effective and legitimate and would be the best vehicle through which to create UNEPS. The respondent above believed firmly in the humanistic ideals of the UN Charter and, based on first-hand experience as a director of a department in the Secretariat, claimed the UN was a place where you could "get things done". His trust in the UN was grounded on his perceived competence of the organization. The respondent's lifetime work in government and international organizations to realizing his social and economic ideals suggest his faith in the capacity of individuals to effect positive change across nations and globally. While he was enthusiastic about the proposal, he cautioned against promoting a service with a narrow mandate. It does not make sense for UNEPS to respond only to R2P crimes, he claimed, "when 1/6 of the world is dying of hunger and one of the major impediments to addressing this is war". He suggests that widening UNEPS' mandate to address what he perceived as the world's most pressing problems would increase target actors' support for the proposal. Further strengthening their support for UNEPS, he argued, would be to craft variations of the proposal such as "a much smaller force of highly qualified permanent officers".

The perception that UNEPS' composition would make it a more effective resource for Chapter VII-mandated interventions appeared to influence the trustworthiness of the proposal for a former Australian Shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs. Unlike those in previous categories, his interest in the proposal is based on its robust military capability: "We can't be naive – there are very few circumstances where they [UNEPS] would not have to use coercive force –either to arrests of bad people, self defense, or to protect innocent civilians". He suggested that a UNEPS with a regional character—"local expertise and knowledge"—would increase the effectiveness of the intervention and increase its legitimacy in the eyes of the intervened.

Another respondent, who has worked for USAID, served in the US armed forces and as director of humanitarian NGOs supported the UNEPS proposal for two main reasons. First, the gap a multidimensional service would fill in humanitarian relief and, second, his faith in humanity and commitment to "helping people". Due to his institutional distrust in the UN, this respondent also advocated "melding the UN with regional bodies" to give UNEPS the legitimacy and capability required for political support and practical efficiency, respectively.

A respondent from an NGO in Mozambique maintained that UNEPS was "extremely urgent and should be in place right away, it will be able to curb the violence and allow people to live in dignity". Having worked in Africa for over 15 years, his desire to prevent conflicts in Central African Republic and Darfur seemed to inform is views. This respondent was aware of the challenges in deploying such a service and suggested a smaller scale UNEPS that would be less intimidating for countries in the Global South, especially governments in Africa.

A senior official in the Malaysian Foreign Ministry also showed his personal enthusiasm for UNEPS and suggested,"Having gone through the system [Foreign Service], I'd imagine if our people were presented with this proposal they would be quite supportive". While acknowledging the suspicion some might have in a supra-national military at the behest of the UN, he suggested that UNEPS comprising more police than military might overcome this. Such personnel, he argued, would be under a civilian arm but also be trained and equipped to look after their security and the security of others. His reasons for supporting the UNEPS proposal were based on his experience representing his government during multiple conflicts around the world. He was frustrated with decision-making process in the UNSC and peacekeeping operations being "bogged down" because of the lack of resources. Citing logistical and professional reasons for his support, he said: "It makes sense…if the council decides to intervene, it is incumbent upon member states to translate that decision and move quickly on the ground. Why delay?" Buttressing his support was the belief that UNEPS' would have a positive impact on peacekeeping and the UN's ability to achieve its mandate.

Framing

While the R2P doctrine achieved initial universal support and rejuvenated discussions on humanitarian intervention and the prevention of genocide and crimes against humanity, recent years have witnessed some decline in enthusiasm for this initiative. A respondent working for an R2P advocacy organization noted that "R2P and UNEPS are complimentary and reinforce one another" which promoted her to suggest joint advocacy strategies. She cautioned, however, that R2P remains unevenly supported and suggested customizing UNEPS' advocacy to maximize governments' support. On a similar note, a UN Force Commander said, "I was part of the High Level Panel that included the concept of the Responsibility to Protect in its report. I certainly endorse R2P, but it will not find universal acceptance easily. The idea will need to be discreetly nurtured". The Commander indicated strong support for UNEPS stating that the "principles and structure" of the proposal were compelling and that, based on his experience in peacekeeping, such a service was critical in the protection of civilians.

Political Entrepreneur

A Japanese parliamentarian who has supported and incorporated UNEPS into his policy platform

said, "I believe and support this idea". Having said this, he argued that "the face of UNEPS is critical… to sell it I need a non-western face". GAPW is one of the 'faces' of the UNEPS proposal. While it has a multicultural team it is still viewed by some as an American organization. In response to the challenges posed by the Japanese Senator, the Malaysian Foreign Affairs official suggested that a way to counter suspicions that UNEPS would be a vehicle for the West to interfere in the affairs of the Global South would be for like-minded countries from the West and NAM countries to take the lead.

What attracted the director of an NGO committed to pluralism in Islam was that that UNEPS and its proponent represented the pursuit of peace and human rights. To use Goffman's terms, the proposal is "giving off" the expression of care. This respondent exhibited institution-based trust in the organizations representing UNEPS—GAPW, WFM and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation—because their interests are seen to align with those of his organization.

The perceived trustworthiness of the individuals representing an idea is also instrumental to the support it receives. Over half of the target actors one UNEPS advocate encountered asked about her ethnic background and some inquired into her religion (she was Australian born but ethnically Lebanese). In light of the anti-Australian/American undertones during some of her visits to Southeast Asia, her Middle Eastern heritage made her a more trustworthy representative of the proposal than her nationality. Especially in Indonesia and Malaysia, respondents seemed more open about sharing their misgiving about the proposal after they had identified her ethnicity.

Explaining Authentic Trust

It is tempting to explain respondents in this category using an idealist lens. This theory, however, fails to account for the doubt and uncertainty they all express. These respondents do not blindly trust the UNEPS proposal. Rather they display a high degree of optimism in its potential though they accept, and accommodate for, the distrust of others.

Trust in the competency of UNEPS—including its robust military capability and capacity to respond rapidly to crises—influenced respondents' to support the proposal. Many also seemed to lend their support to UNEPS based on signs a disposition to trust and benevolent beliefs. In other words, they appeared to have a general tendency to trust across a broad spectrum of situations and people. They also appeared to care about the welfare of the others and were therefore motivated to act in their interest.[46] Their commitment to idealist organizations and initiatives seems to support this observation. Respondents' recognition of the ambitious scope of the proposal and its need for a region dimension led them to suggest slight alterations to increase its acceptability.

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[46] Op. Cit., McKnight and Chervany, 1996, pp. 33, 37

While respondents in the Authentic Trust category supported UNEPS, they still cautioned against associating the proposal too closely with R2P. The implicationwas that the history of distrust surrounding humanitarian intervention would dilute target actors' support of the proposal. The former UN Force Commander noted, "the legacy in my country, India, where military intervention is a frightening idea means that discussions of R2P with UNEPS should be done in a slow and consultative manner".

While respondents in this category all supported the individuals and institutions championing the UNEPS proposal, they suggested that, to increase the likelihood of others trusting the proposal, it was important to give the proposal a "local face". The implication was that this would increase the perceived honesty and predictability of the proposal.

Conclusion and Research Findings

We have used trust theorists to help us identify the grounds for respondents' trust and distrust in UNEPS and thus consider strategies beyond forcing or cajoling target actors to support this reform proposal. Our analysis casts doubt upon the common-sense assumption that those from the Global South or NAM states would reject an idea like UNEPS. We have shown that respondents' support of the proposal has just as much to do with their constructs on trust as their national, political or regional affiliation. We have also shown that trust is not just an attitude or set of beliefs and intentions. It is an aspect of culture and, for some, a skill that can be cultivated. For others, their resistance to the UNEPS proposal appears intractable. But this should not stop advocates heeding the recommendations of those who are interested in, yet caution of, the proposal. We conclude with some suggestions on how this might be achieved.

"TAN Localization"

Acharya describes "localization" as the "active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which result in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices".[47] He addresses the role of the local political entrepreneurs or TANs when he argues that "[norm] diffusion strategies that accommodate local sensitivity are more likely to succeed than those who seek to supplant the latter… outsider proponents are more likely to advance their cause if they act through local agents, rather than going independently".

While GAPW comprises actors from diverse regions, the core initiatives, strategy and advocacy is conducted from its secretariat in New York. This especially pertains to respondents for whom historical distrust in UNEPS-related ideas and practices were enhanced by the perception that 'white faces' were driving the proposal. Acharya further notes the importance of local initiatives in norm diffusion: "local actors borrow and frame external norms (ideas) in ways that establishes

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[47] Op. Cit., Acharya, 2004, p. 249

their value to the local audience". What we have called "TAN localization" enacts this process thereby increasing support for the UNEPS proposal.

Farrell believes that when there are overwhelming asymmetries of power in a relationship, trust is almost impossible. He goes on to argue that "even where the more powerful actor genuinely wishes to behave in a trustworthy manner…she may have difficulty in persuading the less powerful actor of her good intentions".[48] The perception that GAPW is a western-controlled entity representing the interests of power states and organizations would be the kiss of death for UNEPS.

Consequently, measures must continue to be taken to "de-centralize" and "localize" UNEPS-related activities away from New York and into regional centers. GAPW's latest policy document acknowledges this, stating: "Global Action is committed to providing encouragement and capacity support to ensure that more and more of our core research, advocacy and leadership functions are coordinated outside of the US". These regional centers could conduct core research, policy development and government outreach. The GAPW office in New York should ideally function as a UN liaison office coordinating activities in the Global North. It is further critical to invest in local political entrepreneurs to develop and advocate the UNEPS proposal. This can be done through regional interviews (as per this research), regional workshops and building the capacity of regional partners and nurturing new political entrepreneurs.

Regional Consultation

People tend to be more receptive to, and trusting of, UNEPS once consulted about its feasibility and legitimacy. Such consultations often demystify vague and unfounded suspicions of the proposal and create opportunity to transcend the distrust. GAPW recognized that regionally-specific cultural, political and linguistic elements needed to be considered to increase feasibility of the proposal and facilitate its implementation. Since the establishment of UNEPS in 2002, the proposal has evolved through wide regional consultations including regional workshops in Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa and Cameroon.

Ongoing regional consultations should focus aim to partner with influential local and regional organizations to: (1) expand the emerging TAN and strengthen its ability to spread the proposal; (2) provide forums to refine the issue characteristics and framing of the proposal; and (3) gain access to respected and influential regional political entrepreneurs.

Proposal Modification

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[48] Ob. Cit. Farrell, p. 3

Respondents in the last two categories provided proposal modifications that they believed would increase the trust of those less supportive of the proposal. Such modifications included giving UNEPS a regional character; emphasizing its diverse capabilities; customizing and carefully constructing advocacy on UNEPS' core characteristics; having a 'non western' face to represent the proposal; and scaling back the proposed size and mandate of the service.

GAPW has responded to some of these concerns and should continue to do so. Since 2002, they have emphasized certain properties of the proposal to incorporate different political, institutional and normative perspectives. These include investigations into a regional character for UNEPS and increased regional advocacy. This indicates flexibility of the TAN and its ability to ensure ongoing modification to maximize target actors' trust in proposal. Further consultation would assist in influencing these target actors and potentially expand the TANs international reach.

Prevention vs Intervention

The ICISS report on the Responsibility to Protect outlined three areas of action: responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild. Only in "extreme and exceptional cases" does the report recommend military action.[49] Unfortunately, recent flawed interpretations of R2P have led to an excessive focus on military intervention and not enough emphasis on the prevention. As a respondent at an Australian university noted, R2P is being interpreted as a tool for powerful states to intervene in less powerful ones and, at times, a moral cover for politically-motivated, unilateral interventions.

It is important that UNEPS is not burdened with a purely intervention-based framework. Political sensitivities and concerns outlined by many respondents dictate that UNEPS is firmly placed on the preventative end of the civilian protection spectrum. The former UN Special Advisor on Prevention of Genocide, Juan Mendez, says "UNEPS is to protection what the International Criminal Court is to accountability".[50] In other words, the threat of rapid deployment of peacekeeping deter government from committing mass human rights abuses or to rely more urgently on diplomatic methods of conflict resolution.

The proposal should be couched as in a preventative framework, beyond the traditional realm of humanitarian intervention. Proponents should also focus on all the 'pillars' in the R2P framework. Such strategies are crucial in the quest to reduce historical, cultural and political suspicions surrounding intervention. GAPW has already started to do this. This advocacy message must be circulated through its regional centers and in dialogue with governments.

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[49] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001). *The Responsibility to Protect*, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre
[50] Méndez, J. (2009). "Standing for Change in Peacekeeping Operations." New York: Global Action to Prevent War