United Nations Emergency Peace Service: One Step Towards Effective Genocide Prevention

This paper focuses on the necessity of a standing, international peacekeeping service and recommends that it is in the interests of the United States to support – both financially and diplomatically – the establishment of a permanent integrated mission capacity within the U.N. Over the last 15 years, the U.N. has taken, on average, 46 days to begin the deployment of peacekeepers and 13 months to fully staff missions involving rapid deployment or crisis response. The proposed United Nations Emergency Peace Service could fill the gap between the Security Council’s authorization of a peace operation and the actual deployment of a conventional peacekeeping mission. This service would help the U.S. to meet its dual goals of averting genocide and preventing loss of American life in dangerous environments.
Acknowledgements:


Citizens for Global Solutions would also like to recognize participants of the global working group that we have had the honor of coordinating with since 2003. This group conceived and developed the UNEPS proposal. We are particularly grateful to Lloyd Axworthy, Lois Barber, Alicides Costa Vaz, Richard Falk, Senator Tadashi Inuzuka, Robert Johansen, David Krieger, Dr.Peter Langille, Juan Mendez, Saul Mendlovitz, Manuela Mesa, William Pace, Stuart Rees, Jennifer Simons, Alice Slater, Hussein Solomon, Sir Brian Urquhart, Detlev Wolter and Joanna Weschler, all of whom have brought their incredible combination of intellectual rigor and unwavering belief in the power of ideas to change the world. Special thanks are owed to Kavitha Suthanthiraraj and Bob Zuber, conveners of the working group, who patiently answered our questions and kept us on track throughout the writing process.
Introduction

In 1994, General Roméo Dallaire, commander of the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) insisted that with 5,000 troops and the right mandate, most of the killings in Rwanda could have been prevented.

In 1998, several American institutions decided to test Dallaire’s assertion. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University and the United States Army, undertook a joint project to consider the potential impact that an international military force would have had in Rwanda. Thirteen senior military leaders addressed the issue. A report based on their presentation, as well as other research, was prepared for the Carnegie Commission by Colonel Scott Feil of the U.S. Army.

Feil’s conclusion was straightforward: “A modern force of 5,000 troops...sent to Rwanda sometime between April 7 and April 21, 1994, could have significantly altered the outcome of the conflict...with forces appropriately trained, equipped and commanded, and introduced in a timely manner, could have stemmed the violence in and around the capital, prevented its spread to the countryside, and created conditions conducive to the cessation of the civil war between the RPF and RGF.”

While military force may sometimes be required to stop genocide, the U.S. and other nations generally view unilateral intervention as impractical and ineffective. For that reason, the U.S. has voted in the United Nations Security Council to authorize numerous peacekeeping missions, 17 of which are currently operational and a number of which are reactions to mass atrocities. These missions have proven to work in the national interest of the U.S. They have enabled the U.S. to uphold its commitment to help maintain international peace and security while avoiding the placement of Americans in harm’s way. Also, working through the U.N. allows the U.S. to share the financial and resource burden of such missions with international partners. Thanks to its strong track record, the United Nations has earned a reputation as a legitimate and effective peacekeeping instrument.

Despite this, the U.N. continues to encounter serious obstacles in carrying out the peacekeeping duties with which it has been tasked by the international community. The current crisis in Darfur all too vividly illustrates these challenges. Peacekeepers are slow to deploy, their weapons and communications often lack interoperability and they encounter problems in acquiring critical pieces of equipment such as night-capable helicopters.

Furthermore, they are comprised of national units that rarely train together and are hampered by weak Security Council mandates that often reflect the available resources rather than the specific requirements of any given mission. Yet, despite these obstacles,

the U.N. remains the most promising institution through which to carry out genocide intervention.

This paper focuses on the necessity of a standing, international peacekeeping service and recommends that it is in interests of the U.S. to support – both financially and diplomatically – the establishment of a permanent integrated mission capacity within the U.N. The establishment of this force – known to its supporters as the United Nations Emergency Peace Service (referred to in this paper as UNEPS or “the Service”) – could fundamentally change the way in which the international community responds to genocide and help the U.S. meet its dual goals of averting genocide and preventing loss of American life in dangerous environments.

As envisioned, the Service would add to, not replace, existing peacekeeping capacity. It would be designed primarily as a “first in, first out” unit that could fill the gap between the Security Council’s authorization of a peace operation and the actual deployment of a conventional peacekeeping mission. It would individually recruit, train, and employ 15,000–18,000 individuals including civilian police, military personnel, judicial experts, relief professionals and others with a diverse range of skills. The Service would have expertise in peacekeeping, conflict resolution, environmental crisis response and emergency medical relief. Upon Security Council authorization, the Service would be available almost immediately to respond to a crisis. Due to its size, UNEPS would not eliminate the need for longer, more traditional peacekeeping operations, although it would likely reduce the cost and length of, or sometimes the need for, subsequent operations. Additionally, as a permanent organization, UNEPS would develop institutional memory and doctrine; its leaders could impart lessons learned to national and regional peacekeepers to improve the effectiveness of peace operations worldwide.

The United Nations: An Integral Part of United States Genocide Intervention Policy

The U.S. has experienced political and logistical obstacles to utilizing force to react to genocide, for a number of reasons. First, ongoing global commitments of U.S. military forces, such as those currently in Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce personnel and equipment readiness levels, limiting the resources available for genocide intervention. Second, although U.S. strengths include rapid deployment, strong command and control and well trained and equipped personnel, the U.S. military is not primarily structured or trained to conduct peace operations. Third, a U.S., NATO or other regional force may be perceived by potential host countries to be utilizing peacekeeping operations as a means of pursuing a narrow national agenda. Fourth, successive administrations and Congress have been reticent to accept the deployment of U.S. personnel into harm’s way when immediate U.S. economic or security interests are unclear.

In light of these realities, U.S. policymakers often prefer to work through international institutions and support efforts led by other nations to respond to mass atrocities and other threats to international peace and security. Despite its current operational limitations, the U.N. offers an attractive alternative to unilateral or regional-group-led peacekeeping.
In 2005, the RAND Corporation examined eight completed U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Belgian Congo, Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, Sierra Leone and East Timor.2 The study concluded that two-thirds of these were “successful.” RAND also found that for most nation-building missions, the U.N. provides the most suitable institutional framework because of its comparatively low cost, expertise and high degree of perceived international legitimacy. According to this study, U.N. peacekeeping is a highly effective means of placing post-conflict societies on the path to enduring peace and democratic governance, and the most efficient form of international intervention available. Alternatives to the U.N. are either vastly more expensive or considerably less effective.

Another study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office estimated that it would cost the U.S. about eight times more to unilaterally conduct an intervention in Haiti than it cost the U.N. to conduct the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).3 The MINUSTAH budget – of which the U.S. paid one fourth – totaled $428 million for the first 14 months of the mission. Had the U.S. conducted such a mission unilaterally, it would have spent $876 million with no guarantee of international partners to share the cost. The study cited the U.N.’s perceived impartiality and legitimacy, staff members experienced in post conflict peace building operations and its structure for coordinating international assistance as factors contributing to its effectiveness and efficiency.

Improving United Nations Genocide Intervention Capacity

The U.N. clearly has the capacity to successfully and cost-effectively conduct complex peacekeeping missions when it has the resources to do so. Given the U.N.’s existing competencies and strengths, it is in the interest of the U.S. to invest in the U.N. so that it develops a capacity to react effectively to genocide. With the necessary tools and resources, this goal is within reach. However, for it to be realized, the U.N. needs to vastly improve the deployment speed, consistency and accountability of its peacekeepers.

**Speed of Deployment**

Former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan compared the job of building support and raising funds for each new U.N. peacekeeping mission to that of a volunteer fire chief, who is forced to raise funds, find volunteers and secure a fire truck to respond to each new fire. “The core challenge to the Security Council and to the United Nations as a whole in the next century,” he declared, is “to forge unity behind the principle that massive and systematic

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violations of human rights – wherever they may take place – should not be allowed to stand.”

Annan established the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations “to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future.” In 2002, the panel released its findings, known collectively as the Brahimi Report, and strongly recommended improvements in rapid and effective deployment as well as planning and management of operations.

For the first time in the history of the U.N., the Brahimi Report defined “rapid and effective deployment.” It established a goal of full deployment of traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution and 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations. The Brahimi Report’s 30/90 timeframes were considered ambitious and were based on the implementation of other recommendations including strengthening standby operations, better training, advanced planning, logistical support and improved mission leadership.

However, the U.N. consistently fails to meet the Brahimi 30/90-day benchmark. Over the last 15 years, the U.N. has taken, on average, 46 days to begin the deployment of authorized peacekeepers. For nine of the 15 missions examined, less than 15 percent of the authorized force was deployed in the first 90 days. And on average, the U.N. took 13 months to fully staff its authorized peacekeeping missions (see chart page 7).

The conflict in Darfur illustrates in stark terms the gap that often occurs between authorization of a mission and full deployment of peacekeepers, and the devastating consequences of this delay. The conflict began in 2003 when fighting broke out between the Sudanese government, the government-backed Janjaweed militia and rebel groups. In July 2007 the Security Council authorized a joint African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID, Resolution 1769). The Resolution authorized the deployment of 26,000 personnel (police, military and civilian) with operational command and control structures to be in place by October 2007 (3 months after resolution) and full deployment by December 2007.

On 1 January 2008, nearly six months after the SC resolution, UNAMID formally took over peacekeeping responsibilities from the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS). However, in a statement to the U.N. Security Council in April 2008, A.U./U.N. Joint Special

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Representative for Darfur Rodolphe Adada lamented that UNAMID’s force strength was at less than 40% of its mandated level, and that was is unlikely to achieve full operational capacity before 2009.9

In a September 2005 report by the World Health Organization it was estimated that around 3.3 million, or 50% of the population, require humanitarian assistance.10 Recent comments by John Holms (UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs) place mortality rates at nearly 300,000.11 Based on the high level of violence in the region, even the Brahimi benchmark of 90 days would have allowed for many to perish in the interim, illustrating the importance of rapid and effective deployment in reducing civilian deaths.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is another example of a violence crisis where an emergency peacekeeping force would have been warranted. The nation began to experience escalating violence in 1998, and some clamored for a U.N. peacekeeping mission to intervene. In February 2000, Security Council resolution 1291 initially authorized

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6,000 troops, yet deployment of even the first 100 troops took more than two months and
troop strength only reached 4,300 by January 2003 (more than three years after the initial
authorization).\textsuperscript{12} It is estimated that 5.4 million people have died due to unrest in the DRC,
at a rate of approximately 45,000 per month.\textsuperscript{13}

These cases illustrate that even meeting the \textit{Brahimi} benchmark will not sufficiently reduce
casualties when responding to genocide or mass atrocities. In situations of spiraling
violence, an emergency response is required so that an effective first wave of
peacekeepers can be on the ground within 48 to 72 hours of Security Council
authorization.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{Training and Accountability}

The establishment of a permanent peace service would fundamentally improve the
cohesiveness, accountability and integrity of the U.N. system’s response to genocide.

For conventional U.N. peacekeeping missions, training personnel is the responsibility of
troop-contributing nations. Troops gathered from different countries often exhibit varied
skill sets and levels of experience and use communications and weapons systems that are
not interoperable. While training guidelines are provided by the U.N. Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, adherence to these guidelines is difficult to monitor. As a result,
personnel involved in peace operations often lack the skills essential to immediately
establish peace and security in a crisis environment.

Interventions to halt mass atrocities require complex missions incorporating police units
and other civilians that are too often poorly trained for this type of work. Countries
responsible for equipping and training genocide intervention missions do not always have
the capacity to supply the needed resources or provide even basic training
for peace operations. Often, military, police and other experts do not train with
each other and are forced to learn “on the job” how to support each other’s
objectives. Also, personnel in genocide intervention require multi-dimensional
training to address topics like gender sensitivity, peace building and cultural issues,
knowledge of which is essential to understanding conditions on the ground during a peace
operation. Finally, as U.N. operations are currently built from scratch, they do not enjoy the
kind of institutional memory or coherence that national peacekeeping and military missions
do.

\begin{quote}
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cohesiveness, accountability and integrity of the U.N. system’s response to genocide.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{12} MONUC authorization was expanded to 15,700 in October 2004 with approximately 16,600 troops in the Congo as of
\textsuperscript{13} “Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing Crisis.” \textit{International Rescue Committee}, 2007. May 20,
\textsuperscript{14} “A United Nations Emergency Peace Service, To Prevent Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity.” \textit{Global Action to
In addition, the first wave of troops deployed for many U.N. missions are “re-hatted,” or moved from a different mission. In fact, one study found that over 50 percent of the first troops to arrive at their mission sites were re-hatted. This exacerbates troop fatigue and coordination problems.\textsuperscript{15}

Another problem that the U.N. is grappling with, as witnessed most recently in the DRC, is peacekeepers who have been accused of corruption and sexual exploitation. Although the U.N. has implemented a strict code of conduct for it peacekeepers, adherence to U.N. guidelines can vary as different national contingencies rotate in and out of missions. Individual member states are responsible for holding peacekeepers accountable for their actions. However the troop receiving nations and the U.N.’s reputation suffer when peacekeepers violate the rules.

Since the release of the \textit{Brahimi Report}, the U.N. has made great strides in addressing these challenges. However, some of these issues cannot be resolved by the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and are endemic to the U.N. system – as currently constituted. Member states will always train their troops differently. Specialized personnel will always lack coordination with military units. And meeting rapid deployment goals will remain difficult so long as it is dependent on the timely fulfillment of troop, equipment and resource pledges by member states. To address these issues, the U.S. and other member states should invest in a small, permanent, integrated mission capacity within the U.N. that can deploy rapidly and function coherently.

\textbf{Needed: A U.N. Emergency Peace Service}

UNEPS is envisioned as a permanent U.N. integrated mission capable of responding within 48 to 72 hours after a Security Council resolution. If established, UNEPS deployment speed would leapfrog the inadequate \textit{Brahimi Report} goal of 30 to 90 days. While the overall size and makeup of such a service should be negotiated between member states with continuing input from military and civil society experts, there are five key principles to which the global working group of practitioners, academics and advocates that first proposed UNEPS have agreed:

- It would be a permanent entity, based at a U.N. designated site with mobile field headquarters, and the ability to mobilize swiftly as a rapid response force;
- Its staff would be individually recruited from diverse backgrounds and many countries, so that the Service would not suffer the delays inherent with ad hoc forces or the reluctance of U.N. member states to deploy their own national units;
- Its personnel would be carefully selected, expertly trained, and coherently organized, so that it would not fail in its mission due to a lack of skills, equipment, cohesiveness, experience in resolving conflict, or gender, national, or religious imbalance;
- It would be a dedicated service with a wide range of professional skills under a single command structure, prepared to conduct multiple functions in diverse U.N.

\textsuperscript{15} Suthanthiraraj, 3.
operations, enabling it to avoid divided loyalties, confusion about the chain of command, or functional fragmentation; and,

- It would provide an integrated service encompassing 15,000 to 18,000 civilian, police, judicial, military, and relief professionals enabling it to deploy the most essential components for peace and enforcement operations.

The need to build each mission “from zero” and the political constraints applied by troop-contributing and mission-supporting nations are major obstacles to achieving rapid and effective deployment. Because UNEPS personnel would be employed by the U.N., deployment would not be held hostage by the sometimes mercurial demands of troop-contributing nations. Thus, UNEPS would be able to respond rapidly to genocide and would vastly increase the likelihood of meeting U.S. and U.N. genocide prevention goals. In addition, UNEPS could also speed up deliberations in the Security Council that otherwise might be hampered by concerns that troops will not be available for a given mission.

UNEPS would serve as a deterrent to potential genocidaires, who would likely hesitate to follow through with their plans if they were aware that a rapidly deployable force is available. In addition, when early warning signs of genocide are apparent, the Security Council could craft resolutions stipulating preventive UNEPS deployments if specified benchmarks are not met.

The Service would include personnel expert in conflict resolution, environmental crisis response and emergency medical relief as well as peacekeeping. It could also include a “Standing Rule of Law Capacity,” with U.N. police, legal and judicial experts.16 UNEPS would benefit from an integrated training climate for military, police and other civilian components. UNEPS would also benefit from the accountability of its personnel to the U.N. rather than individual member states. Misbehavior would not be tolerated. Strict enforcement of a higher standard of behavior would add to the legitimacy and effectiveness of UNEPS.

Its military component would likely include two complete mission headquarters with military, police and civilian staff, technical reconnaissance units, lightly-armored reconnaissance squadrons, motorized light infantry, armored infantry, a helicopter squadron, an engineer battalion and a logistics battalion. (A sample ‘modular’ organizational chart of the Service’s headquarters, base and deployable units proposed by Dr. H. Peter Langille is available in Annex A). Of course, the final composition and size of the Service would be determined by the appropriate U.N. experts.

However, it is envisioned that each field unit would contain sufficient strength and versatility to provide robust security. In addition, units would encompass the necessary range of skills and services to initiate conflict transformation and help establish the rule of law within their respective spheres of control while also addressing basic human needs. For example, UNEPS might simultaneously deploy military personnel to prevent large-scale killings, disaster relief professionals to respond to environmental crisis and police to

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provide safety in tense local communities or protect those delivering humanitarian services. Where needed, it could also provide reliable, early, on-site fact-finding, rapid civilian protection and information-gathering for criminal investigations.

Some critics may assert that UNEPS could intervene where circumstances do not warrant intervention, but these concerns are unfounded. Since UNEPS would rely on the Security Council to explicate its mandate and authorize it to deploy, the U.S. would have an effective veto over any proposed intervention. Moreover, like conventional peacekeeping forces, the Service would be relatively small and lack offensive military capabilities, rendering it incapable of large scale war-fighting.

Cost

Depending upon its final structure and field operations, start-up expenses for UNEPS could equal $2 billion, with an annual recurring cost of $900 million or more. This cost could reasonably be offset by the future reduction in size, duration and delays of subsequent, conventional U.N. peacekeeping operations, which all too often arrive on the scene too late to stop violence in its formative stages. Early preventive action is generally more effective and less costly than later, larger, more complex efforts. UNEPS would be a cost-effective investment and would reduce the overall U.S. contribution to U.N. peace and genocide prevention operations in the long run.

Growing Support for a Permanent Service

Public support for UNEPS is increasing. A recent poll showed that 64 percent of the population in 14 different countries agreed that the U.N. should have a permanent peacekeeping capability. In the U.S., support was even higher, with 72 percent in favor of such a service.

In addition, internationally recognized organizations such as the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Refugees International and the Better World Campaign have all urged Congress to support the creation of UNEPS (See Annex B for a complete list).

Conclusion

As the U.S. crafts a coherent and farsighted genocide prevention policy, it should look to the U.N. as a crucial partner with unique competencies in this endeavor. Only the U.N. has the legitimacy, multinational participation, international civil servants, police and senior officials with nation-building experience and diverse language skills to coordinate multi-faceted genocide intervention missions. However, the U.N. faces hurdles to its deployment speed, cohesiveness and accountability that cannot be overcome without new tools and resources.

17 Johansen, 30.
Creating the capacities to help the U.N. to meet these challenges is squarely in the U.S. national interest.

A United Nations Emergency Peace Service of 15,000 to 18,000 civilian, police, judicial, military, and relief professionals could save millions of lives and billions of dollars, prevent genocides and keep fragile states from becoming failed states. The Service could quickly and reliably respond to emergencies and bridge the gap until longer-term, stabilizing forces can be organized and made available. In the words of Sir Brian Urquhart, former U.N. Under-Secretary-General, “there is one overwhelming argument for the United Nations Emergency Peace Service. It is desperately needed, and needed as soon as possible.”

UNEPS is still a concept in development. Yet, even at this early stage, it is clear that UNEPS has the potential to fill important capacity gaps and substantially enhance the probability of effective genocide prevention and response. Now is the time for the U.S. and civil society to support the evolution and establishment of UNEPS; to help the U.S. meet its genocide intervention goals and to give humanity a fighting chance to contain its most terrible scourge.

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19 Johansen, 10.
Annex A (continued)

Composition of Deployable Elements for a U.N. Emergency Peace Service
(assume 2 MHQ with 2 complete formations)
(assigned to U.N. Base under a Static Operational HQ and 2 Missions HQs)
Total Personnel in Each: MIL 5000, CIV 304, POL 400

Source: Dr. H. Peter Langille, Urgent: A United Nations Emergency Peace Service
Dear Member of Congress,

We, the undersigned organizations, write in support of H. Res. 213, the resolution calling for the establishment of a United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) capable of intervening in the early stages of crimes against humanity or other humanitarian crises. We urge you to co-sponsor and work for passage of the resolution with its champions, Representatives Albert Wynn (D-MD) and James Walsh (R-NY).

In recent years, the international community has been increasingly called upon to respond rapidly and effectively to emerging crises, yet lacks the tools to consistently answer this call. We believe the time has come for a permanent emergency response service, designed to complement the capacity of the United Nations to provide stability, peace, and relief in deadly emergencies.

As envisioned, UNEPS would individually recruit, train and employ 12,000 - 18,000 personnel with a wide range of skills, including civilian police, military, judicial experts and relief professionals. This ensures that missions would not fail due to a lack of skills, equipment, cohesiveness, experience in resolving conflicts, or gender, national or religious imbalance. The Service could have special expertise in peacekeeping, conflict resolution, environmental crisis response and emergency medical relief. Upon Security Council authorization, UNEPS would be immediately available to respond to a crisis, with first in – first out capabilities.

By intervening in the early stages of urgent situations, UNEPS could help prevent their escalation into national or regional disasters. It is a tool that the international community desperately needs in order to fulfill its “responsibility to protect.” Last spring, Chad’s government requested a U.N. deployment of peacekeepers to slow the spillover of violence from Darfur. However, while the U.N. struggled to prepare the mission, Chad’s government backed away from the request.

UNEPS would also help to create a climate of stability so that confidence building measures can take place. For example, on July 31, 2007 the United Nations Security Council unanimously authorized the deployment of an African Union - U.N. hybrid peacekeeping force (UNAMID). Unfortunately, reports indicate the UNAMID will not be fully operational until well after its December 31, 2007 deadline. If UNEPS were currently in existence, peacekeepers could have been on their way in days rather than months after the agreement, bringing greater stability to the region and perhaps forestalling a change of heart in Khartoum.

The job of building support and raising funds for each new U.N. peacekeeping mission has been compared to that of a volunteer fire chief who is forced to raise funds, find volunteers
and secure a fire truck for each new fire. The U.N.’s goals for “rapid deployment” are 30 days for a “traditional” peacekeeping mission (where all parties agree to allow in peacekeepers) and 90 days for “complex” missions (where spoilers attempt to derail a peace agreement). Unfortunately the U.N. usually lacks the resources to meet these modest goals and will to need set the bar much higher to make an appreciable difference to the civilians caught in the crossfire of today’s conflicts.

A United Nations Emergency Peace Service could save millions of lives and billions of dollars, prevent small conflicts from growing into full-scale wars, and keep fragile states from becoming failed states. It will also reduce the need to expend U.S. lives and resources while effectively allowing others to share the burden. More than two-thirds of the American public supports the U.N. having this capacity. We urge your serious consideration of this important proposal and hope you will join us in support of H. Res. 213.

Sincerely,

3D Security Initiative
American Public Health Association
Americans for Democratic Action, Inc. (ADA)
Americans for Informed Democracy
Amnesty International USA
Better World Campaign
Center for American Progress
Center for International Policy
Center for War/Peace Studies
Centre for Development of International Law
Church Women United
Citizens for Global Solutions
Civitatis International
CivWorld
COLEAD
Community of Christ
Council for a Livable World
Democracy Coalition Project
Earth Action
ENOUGH
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
Foreign Policy in Focus
Fund for Peace
Genocide Intervention Network
Global Action to Prevent War
Global Associates for Health Development
Global Exchange
Global Ministries of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) and United Church of Christ

Global Security Institute
Human Rights First
Human Rights Watch
International Crisis Group
International Rescue Committee
Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy
Maryknoll Global Concerns
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
National Association of Social Workers
National Peace Corps Association
National Priorities Project
NETWORK: A Catholic Social Justice Lobby
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
Peace Action
Physicians for Human Rights
Presbyterian Church, (USA), Washington Office
Rainbow/PUSH Coalition
Refugees International
Save Darfur
Union of Concerned Scientists
Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations
United Church of Christ, Justice and Witness Ministries
United Methodist Church, General Board of Church and Society
United Nations Association of the USA
Universal Human Rights Network
Women’s Action for New Directions
Citizens for Global Solutions is a nationwide organization that inspires America to engage the world. Our members recognize that in today's interconnected world, our lives, our jobs and our families are increasingly affected by global problems. Challenges like terrorism, climate change, failed states and infectious diseases cannot be addressed by any one country alone, not even the United States. Citizens for Global Solutions envisions a future in which nations work together to abolish war, protect our rights and freedoms, and solve the problems facing humanity. This vision requires effective democratic global institutions that will apply the rule of law while respecting the diversity and autonomy of national and local communities.

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